Secret Agents

POPULAR ICONS
BEYOND JAMES BOND

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Statecraft, Spycraft, and Spacecraft: The Political Career (and Craft) of a Popular Hero in Outer Space

JAMES HAY

On their first day on Earth, they will be able to look up and know that there is Law and Order in the Heavens.

—Drax, speaking about his insurrectionist plan to create an Earth-bound super-race in outer space (Moonraker, 1977)

THE BEYOND OF BOND AND BEYOND:
MAPPING THE LIMITS OF POPULAR KNOWLEDGE

During the late 1980s, Tony Bennett and Janet Woollacott's Bond & Beyond: The Political Career of a Popular Hero (1987) became a key text—an often cited and emulated reference point—for thinking about contemporary popular culture and how to do “critical” or “cultural studies” of media. As its authors note in their Introduction, the book was as much an account of “the Bond phenomenon” as an intervention into “the customary assumptions and procedures of cultural analysis.” In part, their intervention was framed in terms of rethinking (moving “beyond”) the combined influence of Marxist, psychoanalytic, and semiotic theory in media and cultural criticism at that time. Also, as the book’s title suggested, the task of moving beyond the objectives of media and cultural criticism involved recognizing what lay beyond the text (or James Bond as text), and beyond the view...
that political agency and power could be explained merely in terms of texts' and readers' perpetuation of ideologies. I begin this chapter by taking a detour through Bond and Beyond to re-engage with its alliterative title and, in so doing, to rethink what has counted as the theoretical and analytic limits—the dispositions as well as the "beyonds"—of media and cultural studies. There are two intersecting lines of questions that this chapter poses about the articulation of Bond to a Beyond.

One has to do with Michel Foucault's proposal of an "archaeology of knowledge" for charting the confluence and interdependence of technologies, institutions, and networks that authorize and discipline knowledge and truth. Though Foucault had little to say about "popular culture," his perspective is useful for studying popular culture as a terrain and an object of "discursive formation" and historical "regimes of truth," asking what authorizes and delimits popular rationalities, and what knowledge remains unauthorized, illegitimate, and secret outside or beyond the technologies, networks, and institutions of those rationalities.

Foucault's historical account of authorities of delimitation serves as a particularly useful starting point for revisiting Bond and Beyond as a project interested (among other things) in the limits of cultural and media criticism, the historical limits of Bond's meaning, and those limits' determination of how and why the Bond phenomenon has mattered. Viewing the limits of discourse and knowledge in terms of what Foucault referred to as "historical a priori" (the various litmus tests that have regulated the possibility of advancing certain knowledge and truths over others) underscores the political implications of Bennett and Woollacott's intervention—their effort to recognize possibilities for the study of popular culture beyond the formalism and textual analysis typical of ideological criticism. In addition to helping situate Bennett and Woollacott's project as an alternative to cultural and media criticism, Foucault's analytic offers useful insights for thinking about how spying, surveillance, as well as popular representations of secret agency have occurred through various technologies, networks, institutions, and governmental arrangements for organizing, sorting, regulating, authorizing, and thus delimiting knowledge. The figure of Bond, and his career as a popular hero, have been materially integral to and instrumentalized through authorities of knowledge and regimes of truth. From this perspective, Bond and spy fiction serve as useful starting points for moving from a study of "popular culture" as ideology and hegemony to an archaeology of the authorities of "popular knowledge" and "popular reason"—and of thinking about Bond's "political career" in those latter terms.

A second line of questions considers the relation between discursive/knowledge formation and the production of space. A Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge (about spying and/or spy-fiction, for instance) gestures toward the space of discursive formation and knowledge production, through its attention to the sites, networks, and limits of formation. This chapter elaborates what is at stake for an archaeology of spy science, spy stories, and popular culture that emphasizes the production/authorization of discourse, knowledge, and space. How do spy science or spy stories (their political agency) occur through the spaces, "webs," and geography of discursive formation, acting on (serving, testing, and problematizing) their limits and delimiting authorities? What role do the popular sciences and stories of spycraft perform in authorizing or problematizing the sites and networks of political agency? If "beyond" refers (in these senses) to the limits of knowledge and power, then the historical process emphasized by Bennett and Woollacott (and somewhat differently by Foucault) are profoundly about the topography and geography of knowledge and power—not just the spaces but the "outer spaces" upon which the spy acts and can be studied.

As I explain below, the intersection of these two lines of questioning leads toward an account and analysis of the spatial production of government, and of the role that popular knowledges play in that production. To the extent that the technologies of spy science and the modalities of spy fiction operate within a field or web of authorities who delimit, discipline, and police knowledge of the world, the "political career" of any "secret agency" involves those agents' operation on and arrangements of government. Modern "secret agency" and its popular representations thus developed through what Foucault has termed Modern forms of "governmentality," and what Nikolas Rose (following Foucault) has termed "governing at a distance." In this sense, the "beyond" of Bond refers to the historical reach of government as a problem of government, particularly on a global stage, and to its outer spaces on which spy science and spy stories (as technologies and agents of liberal government) act. In this latter sense, analyzing the "beyond" of Bond begins at the historical intersection of knowing and governing at a distance, through technologies and networks on which both spy science and stories act and operate. Locating that "beyond" involves recognizing what is considered a problem of space and distance for government, though the spatial analysis may lead to historical questions, such as how the problem of managing space and of governing through space has resulted in changing modalities of spy science and spy stories (as space science and space stories). To the extent that this chapter is about political intervention (the "political career" of popular rationalities), it gets there by locating the beyonds of government, and the reinventions of secret agencies, spy science and spy stories that have supposedly solved that problem of government.

RETHINKING THE POLITICAL AGENCY AND LIMITS OF A POPULAR HERO

One thrust of the title Bond and Beyond was its rejection of the formalism of literary, media, and cultural criticism, not only criticism's preoccupation with the
production of meaning and form through authors and systems of representations, but also criticism's tendency to understand the power of popular media and culture in those terms. The book thus called attention to criticism's tendency either to elide the "politics" of authorship, aesthetics, meaning-making, and systems of representation, or to understand criticism's political project primarily in terms of a textual analysis that focused on the perpetuation of ideologies and their subjects through popular texts/culture (or the blockage of ideological formation through deconstructive art and criticism). Of particular concern to Bennett and Woollacott was the predilection of cultural criticism to expose the way that ideology perpetuated itself through any and every cultural form, and the tendency to assume that the critic possessed a special ability to reveal how ideology secretly informs any text. For media and cultural criticism, popular texts such as Bond fiction operated as the secret agents of ideological formation, clandestinely controlling the consciousness of relatively passive and malleable subjects. Bennett and Woollacott thus sought to avoid "reductionist accounts of popular fiction which typically construe such works as no more than containers for ideology, passing it on unmodified or subjecting it to a formulaic reproduction." As an alternative to this tendency, Bond and Beyond emphasized the contingencies and complications of producing and reproducing the industries, meanings, ideologies, and readers of spy fiction.

As much as Bond and Beyond rejected the kind of media/cultural criticism that promised to reveal the true meaning (or conversely the ideology) of Bond and spy fiction, their project was not interested simply in relativizing and pluralizing the meaning of a spy fiction. Instead, Bond and Beyond situated the production process in what it described as "reading formations"—a strategy that did not assume a priori a unified, stable meaning or ideology of Bond and spy-fiction but that instead viewed the ongoing process of making meaning and reproducing ideology as mediated through interactions between specific texts, readers, and industries. Analyzing reading formations focused on the specific mechanisms and strategies through which texts were brought into a relation with one another, not only by certain industries but also by certain populations of readers. Reading formations are the outcomes of and the provisional frameworks for how texts, readers, and industries produce one another, and as such they are an important starting point (so argued Bennett and Woollacott) for an analysis of popular media/culture as a terrain of political formations.

Bond and Beyond's attention to the reading formations of spy fiction became a provocative and oft-followed example of "cultural studies"—particularly in the U.S. where cultural studies became synonymous with studies of "active audiences" (as opposed to audiences as cultural dupes). Bennett and Woollacott's conception of reading formations built upon the writings of Umberto Eco and Pierre Macherey (the former who already had written about Bond), and it resonated during a time when literary, media, and cultural criticism was engaged with theories of readers and audiences (particularly through Eco, Wolfgang Iser, Robert Holub, and Karl Jauss). In important respects, reader theory (and studies of media audiences that followed reader theory) too often folded reading back into formalist question about the text's meaning, rather than considering (as did Bennett and Woollacott's book) how the "formation" of readers and reading led to a different set of questions—ones more germane to Raymond Williams's proposal at that time for the study of "cultural formation."

Williams's expression "cultural formation" deliberately played on the two connotations of "formation"—as a complete arrangement and an ongoing process. The tension between these two connotations, and particularly the importance of the second, became most central to his and other British intellectuals' appropriation during the 1970s of Antonio Gramsci's writing about hegemonic formation as a "historical bloc," and about Marxism as a "history of praxis" and a "historical praxis." Gramsci is not a point of reference in the theoretical compass of Bond and Beyond, but Williams's and Hall's perspectives about hegemonic formation are. Williams's and Hall's outlines for a "Marxist sociology of culture" (more widely recognized as British Cultural Studies) shared with the analysis of reading formations an interest in understanding cultural formation as hegemonic formation, and hegemonic formation as a "state of dominance" achieved in very specific historical situations through multiple determinations. In this kind of analysis, culture is the profoundly historical terrain of forging, practicing, and living structures of power, but not in unconflicted and predictable ways. Political power, effects, and outcomes are never guaranteed, nor can one ever assume an outcome before conducting an analysis of how formations occurred historically as conjunctural phenomena. In this sense, analysis avoids the mechanistic view of historical cause and effect that was characteristic of certain versions of Marxist theory and criticism at that time.

Bond and Beyond intervened in the historical trend of textual criticism (critically "reading" texts) as a form of (Marxist) social critique. By emphasizing the (re-) production of Bond or spy fiction through reading formations, and the (re-) production of reading formations through the alignment of specific forms of popular media and culture with specific ways of producing and consuming those forms, emphasis shifted from the (ideological) unity of popular figures and forms to the processes involved in the materialization and mattering of specific "formations." The analysis of reading formations highlights the historically situated and always shifting ("open ended") meaning and mattering of popular media. Focusing on formations (as an overdetermined process of production) prevents reading social relations through individual popular texts, or critically "reading"
popular texts as mechanistically engendered by (i.e. as an epiphenomenon of) a single historical factor or a “spirit of an era.” It discourages a position from which a critic stands “outside, above, and beyond” the history of reading, “rescuing a text from a previous misunderstanding” and rescuing the critic’s reader from an ideology that shapes everyone but that critic. In this way, Bond and Beyond turned the Marxist concern with determination—with the “making of history” and the (re-)production of social relations necessary for the reproduction of capitalist mode of production—into a radical historicism of the productivity surrounding popular media.

It would not be too much of a generalization to say that Bond and Beyond was absorbed with the temporality and historicity of the relation between the production/reading of popular media (the dominant “mode” of cultural production) and the production/reading of social relations. The book begins by discussing the view that Bond is “a sign of the times,” and ends by recognizing the “historical variability of the cultural and ideological business that has been conducted around, through and by means of the . . . [Bond] texts.” Entire chapters dwell on the importance of a radically historicist analysis, such as Chapter Two: “The Moments of Bond” and Chapter Five: “The Transformations of Bond.” And the book’s explanation and demonstration of reading formation, as an intervention into Marxist critique as textual criticism, emphasizes the importance of analyzing Bond through a “history of reading”—that is, the historical analysis of how Bond and spy fiction have been read by academic critics as well as journalistic critics and other less professionalized reader/consumers.

Central to Bond and Beyond’s interest in the historical formations of popular media was the idea that Bond or the spy is a “mobile signifier.” Mobility referred to the on-going transformation of the spy as popular hero, and to the temporariness of Bond’s meaning as he has been moved into specific formations of production. “Mobility” also referred to the cultural activity surrounding Bond in the different moments of his long “career” as a popular hero, though this activity (Bond as culturally and politically “operated”) has less to do with the stealth, invisibility, or shiftiness of this agent/actor than with the spy’s malleability as popular representation and with the historical variability of the observable operations performed on him by different reading formations. Interestingly, in Bond and Beyond’s concluding statement about the political significance of Bond, Bennett and Woollacott note that his “traffic” and movement through cultural formation has not occurred always with the same, predictable political effectivity, and that “to suppose that it has is a consequence of limiting attention to the spaces and possibilities for reading produced within culturally dominant reading formations” (emphasis added). Bennett and Woollacott’s account of Bond and popular media through historical questions (the “moments of Bond” and the history of reading) thus tended to overlook spatial ones regarding the geographic situatedness, territoriality, and mobility of the spy vis-à-vis the production of popular media and culture.

**Bonded Spaces: The Global Stage of Spy Stories and Spy Screens**

I have written elsewhere about the importance of introducing questions of space, geography, and mobility to the study of popular media. My introduction of these questions in this book is less interested in refuting Bennett and Woollacott’s argument than in turning that argument along a slightly different path and set of questions that take seriously and materially their concluding injunction about the need to recognize the traffic, movements, and spaces comprising the historical production of political possibilities through popular media. So while I would pose questions that are overlooked by Bennett and Woollacott’s project (for instance, by calling attention to the “spaces of Bond”), I am not suggesting that mapping the “spaces of Bond” is necessarily a different project than charting the “moments of Bond” (or that “Bond and beyond” is better understood spatially than historically). Rather, following Henri Lefebvre among others, I suggest that the times and spaces of Bond (the historical and geographic formations of popular media and knowledge) are mutually constitutive—productive together and of one another. In this sense, I agree with Bennett and Woollacott’s call to situate the productivity that occurs around popular media representations such as Bond, but I understand sites and the space of productivity in both historical and spatial terms. Furthermore, recognizing Lefebvre’s lessons about “the production of space” does not make irrelevant Bennett and Woollacott’s ruminations about how to understand and analyze the “production of Bond” (its historical relation to a “mode of production,” its historical “over-determination,” and the work or business performed on Bond by industries and consumers as “reading formations”). Quite the contrary. Lefebvre’s famously ambiguous expression, “the production of space,” was part of the debates during the 1960s and 70s about rethinking Marxist accounts of the conditions and forces determining history, though his views have not informed Cultural Studies or critical media studies until recently. And I want to hone in particularly on Bond and Beyond’s interest in rethinking and situating the “production process” of Bond and popular media.

Lefebvre’s intervention is salient on that front in several respects. His expression “the production of space” represented his dialectical view of space as both produced and productive. His discussion of how space is produced was noteworthy because it addressed economic as well as cultural determinations—the familiar Marxist distinction between base and superstructure, and (in France) the debate...
between Marxist political economy and a Marxist Structuralism. His view and
his intervention into Marxist theoretical debates were novel, however, because
he viewed space as productive (a critical determination) of economies, systems
of representation, social relations, and History. In this sense, Lefebvre's account
of the production of space offered nothing short of an alternative to the dualis­
tic view that economy and culture were the primary forces of history, that econ­
omy and culture were separate historical determinations, and that space was the
opposite of history. Space is not a static arrangement but continually in a process
of formation (albeit one that has increasingly supported capitalism and scientific
rationalities). As historically lived, practiced, produced, organized, and deter­
mined, space is socially specific and a provisional formation or arrangement, and
history is "made" on a terrain that has been organized and lived spatially. In all
these respects, Lefebvre recast Marxism's emphasis on "historical materialism" as
a spatial materialism. 37

Lefebvre's account of spatial production offers a useful way of reformulat­
ing Cultural Studies' analysis of "formations" of popular culture and media, and
Bennett and Woollacott's analysis of the modes of Bond's production. 38 In under­
scor ing the multiplicity of determinations and forms of spatial practice, Lefebvre
devoted considerable attention to "spaces of representation" and the representation
space, and he recognized that space "mediated" and operated as "mass medium" or
"mass communication." His writing thus provides a framework for thinking about
"the production of media space." However, he also rightly eschewed the Modern
tendency to differentiate kinds of space (i.e., "media space" or "cultural space" as
entirely extractable from other spatial practices and production). Because space is
produced in multiple and socially/historically specific ways, media space needs to
be understood as produced through multiple spatial practices (overdetermined)
and as one of many determinant conditions for "making history."

There are several implications of thinking about the "times of Bond" as
"spaces of Bond," or in thinking about a Bondian space as the historical and per­
formative "stage" on which Bond acted as a very popular-secret agent. This per­
spective emphasizes particularly the changing relation between the national and
international (global) dimensions of that stage. However, the emergence of "glob­
alization" was not simply a history, or historical narrative, of progress and positive
advancement, or a gradual downgrading of the nation as a sphere for the produc­
tion of popular culture, but rather a centuries-long process of the historical for­
mation and production of global networks and global maps on which the national
production of popular culture as well as the national modes of spy stories and
spy science acted. These include not only the historical distribution and geog­
raphies of popular novels, popular cinema, and reading formations (the history
of reading spy stories and spy science as integral to the production of spaces of
spy science/fiction) but also to the way that networks of producing spy stories
crossed with the networks of global economies and government—and how collec­
tively they produced national and global networks through which both spy
science and spy stories acted. To the extent that the spy developed a "political
career as a popular hero" (Bennett and Woollacott's expression), that figure and
his fictions/knowledge operated on a global stage that was undergoing various
transformations—from colonial forms of empire to post-colonial ones, from films
produced in studios to "runaway" productions, from Bond as a British product to
Bond as a global commodity and figure (an agent of British enterprise globally)
which circulated alongside other British exports. And this global stage was itself
produced through local and regional spatial transformations—the changing rela­
tion between where one read spy stories and where one watched spy films, the
relation between the urban art theater as site of foreign films in the U.S. and the
U.S. suburban multiplex theater.

Whereas Bond and Beyond emphasizes the importance of understanding the
meaning and political significance of Bond, spy stories, and popular culture in
terms of historically situated modes of production and reading formations, Bond
and Beyond tends to understand culture through the corpus and production of
popular fiction (rather than against the background of spy science). As Bennett
has pointed out in his later engagements with Foucault's writing, culture and fic­
tion are not produced and do not matter outside the production and regimes of
positive, scientific discourse and knowledge. 39 Foucault's early writing in particu­
lar situates the arts alongside scientific knowledge, casts culture and civilization
as objects of discursive formation in medicine and law, and points out instances
where art and culture are deployed and regulated by authorities of delimitation
(such as schools and criticism). In one of Foucault's least discussed projects,
I, Pierre Riviere, he places popular media (tabloids, "fly-sheets," and crime mem­
orls) alongside journalistic, medical, and legalistic discourses in order to demon­
strate how they separately and interdependently objectified criminality during the
early 19th century. 40 Inserting popular narrative within the records and documents
that served as proof of a man's guilt or innocence, saneness or madness, allowed
Foucault to demonstrate the interdependence and mutually constitutive operation
of popular narrative and positive knowledge.

Recognizing the connection between positive, scientific knowledge and pop­
nular narrative is useful for thinking about spy science and spy stories as mutually
constitutive (with both, as Foucault notes about the case of Pierre Riviere, acting
upon the same procedures and economies of fact-finding, verification, and eviden­
tiary knowledge). The "transformations of Bond" charted in Bond and Beyond
(the technological regimes of spying, surveillance, and covert warfare represented
in Bond stories) occurred at conjunctions with the transformations of spy science.
The historical "beyonds" of Bond were in part about the interplay between scientific "advancement" and the culture industries and cultural economies that produced the Bond phenomenon. However, the conjunctions of spy science and stories also occurred through the production of space—a geography that not only makes spy science and spy stories productive in local ways (through reading formations) but that makes the limits of circulating knowledge and stories one of the key problems for spy science and fiction (as about the reach and limits of knowledge, about gathering and verifying knowledge at a distance). Spy stories and spy science are not incommensurate networks, geographies, and spaces but are interacting, and sometimes mutually reinforcing, ones.

Significantly, the technologies surveillance in the Bond cycle is hardwired into the agent's spy-craft—the forms of transport and mobility through which he acts (as "secret agent") and that he constantly tests. Central to the Bond novels and particularly Bond films are demonstrations of the hyper-kinetic agent (male and female) whose medium is the "moving image," as it is mediated by the speed of cars, boats, planes, helicopters, and missiles. The tools of the trade are not only spy-ware and weaponry but often their design as modes of transport. The secret agent is a projectile—a highly mobile analyst and weapon whose success depends on mastering the craft (the know-how and vehicles) for rapidly overcoming distance. Spy-ware and spy-wear sometimes conjoin to enhance and maximize the mobility of the secret agent. Bond's technical limits are thus his spatial limits, and his spatial limits are precisely the limits of his spycraft—his technologies of knowledge and communication that act through/ as technologies of mobility. In these respects, the technology of spy science and spy stories converge in regimes of mobility and transport—in staging and representing their capacity to solve the problems of distance through speed. A key to understanding the interface between spy science and spy stories through the production of space is how space is produced, limited, regulated, and overcome through regimes of mobility (regimes that make spatial production commensurate with the organization of knowledge, communication, and transportation). As I explain below, these regimes of mobility are determinant conditions of the governmentalities and economies (i.e., networks) through which spy science and spy stories circulate, and on which they both act.

**THE REACH AND COMPASS OF "GOVERNMENT AGENTS"**

As suggested at the outset of this chapter, the reach and limits of knowledge make the arts and science of surveillance a central problem for the modern government of populations and economies that are dispersed over the territory of nation-states and empires. Surveillance, as the amassing of knowledge, information, and pictures to verify the state of things has depended on the robustness and synergy of transportation and communication networks. And the speed of communication and transport (through electrical grids) has become integral to modern forms of social control and power—to both the orderliness and freedom of movement over distance.

Armand Mattelart, Andrew Barry, and Foucault in particular have emphasized the connection between the emergence of liberal government and the convergence of "technics of space." Liberalism, as what Foucault has termed a "governmental rationality," is about achieving the proper distribution, arrangement, and dispositions for power, control, and freedoms to be exercised in certain ways. "Liberal" government and liberalism's sanctioning/regulation of freedoms (including free movement) have depended on, acted on, and been made possible by the available techniques of surveillance that assure the orderliness of movements, and spot potential disruptions or blockages. Surveying populations and territory, in turn, have depended on the openness, speed, and freedom of movement and circulatory systems. The growth of populations and the expanse of territory that were to be secured and managed required that the networks of surveillance be dispersed—embedded throughout society.

Certainly one important boundary and container of liberal government's formation has been the nation-state, whose model (Foucault argued) became the city as a nexus of interdependent grids. As Barry has noted, the government of the nation-state as population and territory presented certain questions, if not dilemmas, for liberalism: "How could the territorial space of the nation be effectively policed without intruding on the daily lives of citizens? How could public authorities respond rapidly to external or internal threats to the nation? How could the flow of persons and messages be managed in a way that did not restrict unduly the liberty of the individual?"

As these questions indicate, the problem of liberalism became how to govern at a distance through a propitious distribution and arrangement that acted upon technics of space and mobile technologies.

Since the history of liberal government also has been about the reach and limit of the nation-state as territory and population, and since one problem (as Barry points out) has been how to respond rapidly to both internal and external threats, the technics of space and the regimes of regulating mobility have become as important for securing national territory as for maintaining empire (sovereignty beyond national borders). Since the late-18th century, but particularly over the 19th century, trans-national transportation (over land and sea) involved the development of reliable communication and postal networks. Collectively, the interdependent networks of electrification, transportation, and communication contributed to what Mattelart has described as "networks of universalization,"
the strategies of overcoming trans-national difference/distance and of ushering in trans-national governmental institutions for regulating these flows and settling disputes over sovereignty.

Forms of national and imperial surveillance (not restricted to "spying") developed in numerous ways within these governmental strategies. Or rather, the meaning and practice of "spying" have developed through spying's imbrication with, as well as distinction from, historical forms of surveillance and the historical reach and limits of knowledge. Toby Miller (following James der Derian) has discussed spy science and spy stories through the governmental valuing of "intelligence," a term that he considers useful in thinking about screen spies because it refers to the (often secret) testing and measurement of mental capacity—as a scientific operation integral to social policy. Spy science also has developed through the various observational technologies and procedures practiced by sciences of the body and psyche, and through the regimes of accounting and demography. So in this sense, the networks of spy science (and for that matter spy stories) may be directed at particular targets, even as they are simultaneously mobilized through an array of observation, accounting, verification, information-gathering and measurement for securing populations and territory in everyday life. In this latter sense, surveillance is a fairly ordinary and quotidian practice of government, integral to the dispersal of the technologies of government throughout society, and to "governing at a distance." These practices collectively support (and always potentially destabilize) arrangements of governance, whether these arrangements are produced on national territory or as empire.

The science and arts of spying therefore are both extraordinary and ordinary, global and local. Spying pertains historically to military operations and war, but just as importantly to periods of "waging peace" and of policing operations justified as "keeping the peace." The spy can be an instrument of security in both senses, linked as much to military campaigns (as soldier) as to policy (as another diplomat or organ of statecraft)—a warrior in times of peace, and a soldier in civil life in times of war. The production of spy stories in novels, magazines, and cinema thus occur through many of the conventions of police and "government agent" fiction. However, spy stories (particularly through cinema) often have been produced during, or in periods leading up to, war. Spy stories are the extraordinary techniques, measures, and exploits of spying that circulate through daily life, as part of the regime of spy science and surveillance that act on and through the quotidian. And the spy story moves through/upon and mediates the far-off prospects of war, global government, and the local spheres/neighborhoods of daily life—not merely as "escapism" but as agents practiced in the arts and sciences of government that link global networks to the semi-secluded or private spaces for consuming spy stories (e.g., movie theaters or home entertainment centers).

It is just as important, therefore, to recognize that the figure of the spy and the stories/science of surveillance are not only ideological constructions but agents and techniques of government—instruments sanctioned by and supportive of specific/changing governmental rationalities and authorities of delimitation or territorialization. The term "agent" is significant in this sense because it underscores that spies and spying are intermediaries, acting on behalf and as proxies for various authorities, and sanctioned by government commissions and bodies of rules.

Understanding agents of surveillance involves mapping the authorities governing that agency. And from this perspective, mapping the authorities governing the agents of surveillance involves recognizing how spy stories and/or spy science operate historically in conjunction with or even on behalf of state agencies of security and the non-governmental agencies of security within national and global civil society. To understand Bond merely as an agent of imperialist, colonialist, or post-colonialist ideology ignores how the changing forms of Bond fiction pertain to the changing networks and techniques of spy science as sanctioned by governmental operation, policy, and statecraft, and how the orderly operation of government depends on the "rationalization," organization, and delimitation of space and territory.

As Bennett and Woollacott's study implies, Bond is not the author of his operations; he is an "agent." However, Bond is not simply a "secret agent"; he is a "special agent"—a designation that matters not only in his role as an agent of government, but as a government agent operating through popular culture, popular cultural economies, and popular knowledge. Paradoxically, his specialty or specialness is that he is produced through the popular. He may have acquired types of knowledge, or be knowledgeable about specific techniques (science, arts, craft) of spying, but as a "special agent" of government he also is adaptive to many kinds of missions. While the longevity of his "political career" has to do with what Bennett and Woollacott describe as his continual rearticulation through cultural and reading formations, his political career as a special agent (as popular secret) also pertains to his capability to be repurposed and mediated through the political experimentation and changing arrangements of government.

In the Bond cycle, Bond is ritualistically summoned (called forth and "needed") in order to manage a particular crisis in the national and/or global operation of government. Subsequently he is placed both within and against empires—within the conspiratorial knowledge and projects that threaten legitimate governments and states seemingly just beyond their reach. Sometimes, Bond is summoned to mediate, to aid in the conversion of, old and new governmental entities and policies (as when in Goldeneye a leftover program from the Cold War is hijacked and directed against post-Soviet government in Russia and the West). While Bond works for British government, he also mediates as proxy the efforts of Britain to
mediate regional, "allied," and or global government. In numerous films he works in consort with the CIA—as an indirect, interested party in U.S. or Western government. As a filmic or popular hero, Bond works as much on behalf of the State as on behalf of private interests (media industries), as much as an agent of British government and cultural industries as of the U.S. government and civil society through which his popularity is produced or sanctioned. He operates as part of the political and cultural economy of global government and as a representation and representative for interdependent scales and interests of government. In that sense, he operates as a useful mechanism in the alignments and realignments of global government. Understanding the usefulness of Bond stories and spy stories begins by recognizing their capacities as "agents of government" directed as much to the ordinariness of governmental operation as the extra-ordinariness of threats to it—from places at the borders of its reach.

SPYCRAFT AS SPACECRAFT: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF BOND BEYOND THE VERTICAL LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Though not the first Bond novel, Dr. No was the first Bond film, distributed in 1961. In certain respects, the film acted on the already considerable popularity of Bond fiction beyond the U.K., and it launched one of the most globally successful distributions of a film series over the 1960s. In that process, the film became one front of cultural export in the "British invasion" of the U.S. during the 1960s. Dr. No takes place (and is filmed) mostly in Jamaica, an outpost of Britain's pre-WWII empire. Bond is directed to Jamaica in order to gather information about the disruption in the radio lines of communication between a surveillance compound there and the home office of the British secret service in England. Only in the last part of the film does Bond realize that Dr. No's conspiratorial knowledge and project involve sabotaging one of the early manned space launches from the U.S.

Understanding why both Bond and Dr. No find themselves in Jamaica in a 1961 film involves locating their intersecting networks of operation within the historical governance and production of space—particularly the emergent regime and legislation of "outer space." While the Bond phenomenon is frequently described (even explained) as a Cold War event or an (epi-) phenomenon of a Cold War ideology, that description of history subordinates the production of space as a determining condition of spy science, spy stories, and their relation to the formations of liberal government and empire. While astronomical exploration may have been one front and theatrical stage of the Cold War, governing through outer space became a preoccupation about the limits of freedom, and the reach of Western (particularly U.S.) institutions of liberal government. Governing outer space, and governing through outer space, became a recurring problem whose settlement required (among other measures) summoning (extra-)ordinary popular agents such as Bond—a trend that continued well after 1961. Furthermore, the invention of outer space as stage for advancing liberal government required the reinvention of a spy (a popular hero or "test-subject") who was capable of mediating terrestrial distance and reach, even as the development of spycraft (communication and transportation technologies) oriented toward an extra-terrestrial space were making the spy missions less dependent on embodied mobility than had been the case before the 1960s. After four years of experiments with launches of unmanned satellites, the U.S. space program successfully launched its first manned rocket in May 1961—the same year as the release of Dr. No. The history of the astronaut as popular figure (test-subject) conjoined with the history of the spy.

To the extent that the statecraft of early liberal government required strategies and technologies of spycraft, these twin practices/problems converged in the legal settlement of national borders and in the securitization and reach of what nation-states considered terra incognita. Until the late 19th century, securing borders involved international laws regulating international movements across land and sea, with maritime law mostly directed at guaranteeing the openness of sea routes (the "freedom of the high seas") beyond the "sovereign waters" established as protective buffers for nations bound by oceans. By the late 19th century, the number of international regulatory associations began to increase dramatically to address the growth of international networks of transport and communication, and their proliferation attests to the number of problems adherent to the governmentalization of international traffic. Arguably the most challenging objective of international government, and one of the most nettlesome challenges to the sovereignty of nation-states at the turn of the 20th century, was the government of "air space." Edouard Rollin, a representative of the 1906 meeting of the Institute of International Law in Ghent, argued that it was premature to formulate rules for the sky—a space that was as unknown and uncharted as the center of the African continent had been for Europeans fifty years before. As much as regulating the skies above nation-states drew initially on maritime law, the "law of the air" introduced a different problem than maritime law: the "vertical limits of sovereignty." This problem was exacerbated by the concerns about sovereignty and territorial security arising from laws concerning the protection of "private property" (or privacy) as a result of the advantage of looking afforded by balloons and subsequently aircraft. Whereas creating a buffer zone between national borders and "international waters" may have redressed the threat to surveillance from watercraft, the remote distance of aircraft above sovereign territory actually exacerbated the fear and threat of surveillance.

Through the 1940s, air space became a laboratory and a theater for the spy science and spy stories practiced by those nations most committed to regulating
the freedoms of the air. Many of Alfred Hitchcock's films before 1943 concerned characters caught up in affairs and networks of spying on a stage at the outer limits of British sovereignty (or, as in *Saboteur*, along networks of espionage in the U.S.); *The 39 Steps*, wherein the hero is chased by helicopters, cast aerial space as a particularly disturbing dimension of modern surveillance. The spectacular plane crash in the finale of Hitchcock's *Foreign Correspondent* (1940) also linked a U.S. reporter's tracking of the news "story" of the European war to the deepening political instability over the free use of air space and over the vertical limits of sovereignty. Numerous Hollywood films produced during or about World War II (e.g., *Reunion in Paris*, 1942; *Desperate Journey*, 1942; *13 Rue Madeleine*, 1947) continued to represent aircraft and air space as vanguard instruments in a warfare carried out (performed) by spies, sometimes with downed pilots being ferried out of enemy territory through "underground" networks. Although all these films contributed to the narrative elements of spy films, the production and reproduction of the spy genre occurred through the sanctioning of and prohibitions against specific strategies of warfare at that time—particularly strategies for securing and catalyzing air space as a dimension of territorial disputes and battlefields.

The invention of "air space" and the efforts to legislate the "vertical limits of sovereignty" were not simply about fly-over space; they also pertained to the "air space" of radio signals and to the growing synergy between technologies of transportation and communication on airplanes. Radio signaling not only was a technic of space organizing nation-states as audiences and publics, or linking nations with their colonies, it also developed over the 1920s and 30s as a technology of exporting (propagating and "propagandizing") national cultures. And during wartime, radio served as a secretive and invisible form of gathering and conveying information from beyond national borders. Some of the most well-recognized iconography of the intersection between air space and Hollywood's emergent capitalization of global markets were RKO Pictures' branding of its films during the 1930s with an enormous radio tower telegraphing sound waves around the globe, and Universal Pictures' 1930s logo representing a turning globe circumnavigated by a tiny airplane.

The invention of air space and the efforts to legislate the vertical limits of sovereignty contributed after World War II to the invention of "outer space" and "space law." In his Foreword to Andrew Haley's *Space Law & Government* (1963), then U.S. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson noted that "the great new problems confronting civilization in the Age of Space require...that the principles of justice and order should be established in these early days of man's exploration of space." More than rhetorical flourish, Johnson's emphasis upon "justice and order" in outer space was consonant with his longstanding reasoning, expressed repeatedly since the late 1950s, about the role of government in outer space. Partly as a political tactic for rethinking the exclusively military and mostly clandestine early astronomical research, development, and exercises conducted during the Eisenhower administration, Johnson had repeatedly argued for a U.S. space program that would arrange outer space into a rational, liberal-democratic and ethical sphere—a "peaceful" endeavor.

There was a qualitative difference between regulating "air space" and regulating "outer space"—the latter term acquiring its common meaning in part through distinctions from the former term. Not only by Johnson, but particularly in the U.S., "outer space" became a new historical, geographical, and theatrical stage for shaping a discourse about rights and responsibilities, war and peace, security and risk—and thus for redefining the objectives of government and of national sovereignty on a global scale. After World War II, and particularly by the late 1950s as astronautical launches became more frequent, regulating extra-terrestrial space became a key issue in rethinking government of and by nation-states. When the Russian satellite, Sputnik I, began to orbit the earth in 1957, its legal status was unclear. What national laws did it violate, and if it violated no national laws, what international body governed its activity? This seeming unlimitedness, openness, and unregulatedness of "outer space" during the 1950s revolutionized the reasoning about the security and insecurity of nation-states, particularly the U.S. and Russia, who viewed "outer space" as a zone for securing the nation against unfriendly overflight.21

Outer space as a free and open zone, regulated and navigated through a new regime of securitization, thus became an important condition of locating Bond and No in the Caribbean Ocean in the late 50s and early 1960s (the period of the novel and film). It is not sufficient, in other words, simply to think about Jamaica as a setting/site between and between Britain's empire and its "post-colonial" role in the world. The island's, Bond's, and No's proximity to the U.S. makes the film in particular (orbiting through a distribution network that depended heavily on the U.S. market) as much about the old limits and spycraft of gathering knowledge as the ones made possible and problematized through the securitization of *extra-terrestrial* outer space. The film's opening disruption in rather old-fashioned communication (a special frequency on a short-wave radio) eventually leads Bond to No's project to intercept the launch of a U.S. space satellite with a "radio beam." The film's high-speed chases in automobiles (whether exotically modern and technologically sophisticated, or exotically passe and "tricked out") eventually leads Bond to an emergent regime of mobility through the barely or loosely regulated freedoms of outer space. And the link between the British outpost and the home office of intelligence operations eventually intersects with the command and control centers of No and the U.S. Space Agency—competing sites/ images of the new terrestrial points of global governance through outer space. The film's
closing credits acknowledge the location-filming in Jamaica, and its debt to the
U.S. Space Agency for its “assistance.” In this way, Dr. No also seminally estab-
lished and represented the material (political economic) linkage between the
transformation of a colony into a cheap (albeit exotic) location for film production
and the emergence of the U.S. Space Agency’s campaign to promote globally the
peaceful interests of its outer-space program through television (Telstar) and the
international caravan of publicity tours by the early U.S. astronauts.32

The narrative pathways and the political economic networks of the films after
Dr. No regularly acknowledge terrestrial and extra-terrestrial outer space as the
theater and laboratory of Bond—arguably the most popular or recognized secret
agent working to support a liberal government (British and U.S.) oriented toward
and troubled by the vertical limits of sovereignty. And more than Dr. No, these
films emphasized Bond’s interventions as more directly about the securitization
and government of extra-terrestrial outer space, albeit an outer space whose points
of terrestrial contact zones were outside the U.S. and Russia—often hidden in a
“third world” of “non-aligned” and/or post-colonial states. The opening crisis for
You Only Live Twice, published in 1964 and released as a film in 1967, involves
the capture of a two-manned U.S. spacecraft (the “Jupiter 16”) by a spacecraft of
unknown origin. You Only Live Twice thus locates Bond’s mission within com-
peting “control centers” of outer space—the USSR’s, the U.S.’s, Ernst Blofeld’s,
and the meeting place of an unidentified international association of diplomats in
charge of legislating outer space. The diplomatic efforts to stave off the outbreak
of war from outer-space hijackings leads this latter group to summon resources
capable of “covering every square inch” of the terrestrial hiding places for staging
insurrectionist operations in outer space. Answering the call is the human (albeit
nearly superhuman) agent of those governments—an agent who must do the
work of surveillance just as the emergent regime of outer-space communication
and transportation will provide the means of monitoring the earth in that way.

Moonraker, the third Fleming novel (1955), became the eleventh Bond film,
moved up in the production schedule in order to coincide with the launch of the
first U.S. “space shuttle” in 1976. The sequence of these three Bond films charts
the incremental elevation of Bond into extra-terrestrial outer space. In Dr. No,
Bond and the rest of the world only could assume their relation to the U.S. space
program, as Bond foils No’s plan to sabotage the U.S. space test. In You Only Live
Twice, Bond is captured just before he is launched from earth on board one of
Blofeld’s space ships. However in Moonraker, Bond disrupts the conspiratorial
plans of Hugo Drax by surreptitiously co-piloting one of Drax’s space shuttles to
Drax’s invisible/secret space station.

More than prior films, Moonraker foregrounded the interplay of agencies orga-
nized for the effective and “peaceful” government of outer space and for global
government through outer space—represented in the film as an unidentified council
for mediating disputes in outer space, something akin to the European Space Agency
formed in 1974. Complicating Bond’s role as global spy and accountant in this film
is the villain’s commercial production of space-shuttle technology for NASA, and
his production network’s seeming imbrication in the Western sites of outer-space
government. From its inception in the early 1960s, the U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) had been one of the first large-scale public-
private “partnerships” in the U.S. (or anywhere, for that matter). NASA operated as
a new model of liberal government, organized through the public-private admin-
istration of research and development for global peace and security through outer
space. More than prior films, extraterrestrial outer space (as distinguished from the
“outer spaces” of colonial empires) required strategies (public-private ventures) for
“advancing” the reach of liberal government—for shaping outer space as a histori-
cal and geographic stage of lawful and thus unthreatening freedoms. And while the
production of Bond films was a private, commercial enterprise, it materially acted
on the programs for advancing liberal government globally. Whereas the concluding
credits which run at the end of prior Bond films identified the locations around the
world where scenes were filmed, Moonraker (glibly but also in a sense that is techni-
cally correct within the governmental rationality targeting outer space) claimed that
its scenes were filmed in the U.S., France, Italy, Rio de Janeiro, and Outer Space.

More than in prior films, Moonraker also represents a global terrestrial
network for monitoring activities in astronautical space. The government of extra-
terrestrial space may serve the interests of nation-states, and even regional
governmental entities such as the European Space Commission (ESC), but the
global networks for monitoring activities in space is (at least for the networks
serving Western interests) operated through para-state agencies such as NASA
and the ESC. In the film’s final scene, Bond is surveyed by a video link from a
NASA space control center as he floats weightlessly in the space shuttle in an
embrace with his female co-pilot (Holly Goodhead a former NASA special-
ist agent). If, as Miller has suggested, “Bond’s penis comes in
different sizes” (determined by global audiences perception of Bond as either a
cultural imperialist or a “wus”),11 then his gradual elevation beyond the vertical
limits of sovereignty places him onto a new stage/state of global governmentality
from outer space where his embrace (his accountability as government agent) can
always be monitored on screen. While Bond on screen was continually
monitored on screen. While Bond on screen was continually tested as a
reliable strategy for achieving a global civil society from outer space, by the late
1970s, the invention of outer space as a stage and laboratory of securitization-
government-through-communication required that Bond (the residual embodi-
ment of terrestrial spying) had become weightless and tele-visual—ready to be
cybernetically dispatched in and into the future.
FROM AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE TO CYBERSPACE—THE IMMANENT THREAT OF A WAR ON TERROR

There always is the tendency or temptation to look back on older popular cultural forms as quaint or silly—as pertinent to fears and anxieties that have become remote, odd, darkly comic (like the dream of a Death Ray in the 1930s popular culture and science of Flash Gordon). Sean Connery becomes flabby, bald, and old, and Bond is recast and reinvigorated (in the recent popular culture and sciences of “makeover”) by an actor/agent more suited to the serious concerns and challenges of the present. An analysis that locates the knowledge, techniques, stealth, and mobility of the government agent (her/his spycraft) within historical conjunctures and changing arrangements of power is useful precisely to recognize better how present forms of government seek to improve upon (modernize away from) the failures and comedies of the past. The usefulness of revisiting spy sciences’ and spy stories’ relation to the invention of air space and outer space (as achievements, problems, and failures of government) may help us think about the current rationalities that summon and require spies (as popular-secret agents) to embark on the missions that they take.

By the 1990s, in the aftermath of the televised explosion of a U.S. space shuttle (a breakdown and failure of spectacular proportions), with the cumulative proliferation of space programs and agencies among nations other than the U.S. and U.S.S.R, and with the cumulative proliferation of monitoring satellites (particularly from the U.S.), the new terrain of freedoms and of threats posed by seemingly unlimited, unregulated freedoms became associated with “cyberspace.” With the widespread use of the Internet, and the rapid growth of the World Wide Web, cyberspace was often described as a more democratic medium—a purer, if not endlessly unlimited, unregulated freedoms became associated with “cyberspace.” With the widespread use of the Internet, and the rapid growth of the World Wide Web, cyberspace was often described as a more democratic medium—a purer, if not more immaterial/ethereal, medium of popular knowledge and democratic participation than before. By the last years of the 20th century, particularly surrounding the boom-and-bust years of dot.com speculation, cyberspace was represented as the new stage of heroic agency, sabotage, and regulatory crisis—the most mythic threats and actors for which were the “hacker” and the “cyber-terrorist.”

Cyberspace did not make air space and outer space irrelevant as objectives for reinventing and advancing liberal government. Rather, cyberspace developed—as a discursive object, technology, and space of operation—through the rationalities and instabilities of government oriented toward global communication and transportation. Cyberspace was supposed to improve upon or solve the difficulties posed by the freedoms and government of air space and outer space, even as it introduced the possibility of new instabilities.

As a deepening of the freedoms envisaged through outer space, cyberspace became a stage and laboratory for testing the virtues of self-reliance and entrepreneurialism required by a new stage of liberalism (a “neoliberalism”). Through this new entrepreneurialism, old media were reinvented around the requirement of participation and “interactivity.” The year following the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Bush-Cheney administration launched the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, one of whose most energetically pursued objectives has been to provide citizens with the resources by which they can help themselves in times of emergency and national insecurity—to deputize citizens as government agents. The web has become one of the most instrumental resources for a Homeland Security bent on helping citizens help themselves.34 Old broadcast media such as TV that had been catalyzed through Telstar and other experiments in global communication as a pathway to global peace, were “advanced” through the “reinvention of government,” the web and this model of self-sufficient, self-securing citizenship.35

Contemporaneous with the introduction of a Homeland Security in the U.S., the Bush-Cheney administration sponsored a “national strategy for securing cyberspace.”36 Although the term “cyberspace” developed out of “cyber-fiction,” the National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace (NSSC) defined cyberspace through a political rationality about the security of U.S. “national infrastructure”:

Our Nation’s critical infrastructures consist of the physical and cyber assets of public and private institutions in several sectors: agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping. Cyberspace is the nervous system of these infrastructures—the control system of our country. Cyberspace comprises hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that make our critical infrastructures work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national security. Unfortunately, recent events have highlighted the existence of cyberspace vulnerabilities and the fact that malicious actors seek to exploit them.37

Within this reasoning (particularly endemic to the U.S. after 2001), these “vulnerabilities” required nothing short of what one of the authors of the NSSC referred to as “strategic information warfare” (a “new face of war”).38 While there is nothing new about information warfare, the political strategy of information warfare described in this document cast “national security” as the responsibility of every American through Web-resources. And it articulated that campaign in universalist terms, as also mobilizing “international cyberspace security cooperation.” Already by the mid-1990s, the Bond of Goldeneye had begun to confront the kind of “malicious actor” mentioned in the NSSC and the “new face of war” in the eponymous report on “strategic information warfare,” and this new Bond became a (popular “secret”) agent for producing a popular rationality about recognizing
and policing these threats. In *Goldeneye*, the crisis posed by a conspiracy achieved through the World Wide Web was a political threat so significant to U.S. national security that Bond regularly crosses paths with a CIA agent, who suggests to Bond and his female accomplice in the film's final scene that they "debrief one another" at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (a fully protected control center that would become the future site of the infamous U.S. prison for international "terrorists"). Before the birth of cyberspace, Bond may have followed secret, conspiratorial networks around the world, but in *Goldeneye* the network was quite explicitly (if not always visibly) a Web-based network. As much as the computer network in that film becomes the instrument for reactivating a secret Cold War government program for controlling an outer-space network of attack-satellites, the computer network also could be turned into a network of surveillance that allows Bond to discover the conspiratorial control center. Through this film, Bond races to keep up with the computer network, historically and geographically. But as an outgrowth of the surveillance regimes organized through and around outer space, the Web in a 1995 Bond film (a year before the Rand report on "strategic information warfare") seems to have specific centers of control, even as the Web becomes a way of rationalizing the immanence of global threats.

In that the NSSC mentions the need to enlist public and private forms of international cooperation (a global government of cyberspace), the policy's preoccupation with a "national security" threat also requires the formation of native, fully nationalized policing agents other than (beyond) Bond. The return of Bruce Willis's Detective John McClane in *Live Free or Die Hard* (2007) to redress a home-grown insurrection that has recruited a cast of European and Asian terrorist-technicians and young U.S. hackers to shut down the entire U.S. infrastructure through a computer-control center near Washington, D.C., may be much closer to what the NSSC had in mind. But focusing on these films risks missing a central point of that policy's reasoning about a threat to cyberspace and "living free" (and of the Dept. of Homeland Security's motto, "preserving our freedoms"): that as the networks of communication become central and immanent to the infrastructures of communication and transportation, all citizens perform daily roles in looking after their own safety and security. Within this kind of political rationality, we all are potential protectors of national and global security; we all are Bond. And just as importantly, we all are potential saboteurs and "pirates" of those infrastructural networks, that is, we all have a claim to Bond as a popular commodity that circulates through cyberspace. Our potential to abduct Bond from his global circulation (for instance, through file-sharing technology) makes us targets of the networks and agencies that monitor the new "secret" faces of war—agencies, sciences, and networks on whose behalf Bond continues to be deployed as a special(ized) popular agent.
Marx's, Lenin's, and Luxemburg's writings, his valuing of conjunctural analysis (i.e., his view that Marxism is both a "history of praxis" and a historical praxis) also underscored the need continually to resist and rethink Marxism—to consider for instance its reliance with respect to native philosophical traditions, or for activism and organizing within national popular cultures. This dimension of Gramsci's writing particularly gained traction during the 1970s, not only with the "cultural turn" in political theory but in so-called "post-Marxist" debates.

Williams's idea of a sociology of culture, and Bennett's arguments against post-structuralist cultural criticism were interventions in a debate in Britain during the 1970s and 80s (amidst the ascension of Tory government led by Margaret Thatcher) about the legacy and relevance of a Marxist politics. And that latter project, at least in the hands of Bennett and Woollcott, made Bond (arguably one of the most popular Cold War narratives) a way of demonstrating the limitations of literary criticism as Marxist analysis, and the importance of situated, conjunctural analysis of popular media.

1. Bond and Beyond's references to Williams are primarily from the period of his Marxism & Literature (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) and The Sociology of Culture (New York: Schocken Books, 1981). The references to Hall are primarily from Policing the Crisis (Stuart Hall, et al., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978). Significantly, the first and primary references to both in Bond and Beyond appear a section of the book devoted to rethinking Marxist conceptions of "production" and "determination" (Bond and Beyond, pp. 184–190).

10. Williams's explanation of "hegemony" turns primarily to Gramsci in order to correct this epochalist dimension of Gramsci's writing particularly gained traction during the 1970s, not only with the "cultural turn" in political theory but in so-called "post-Marxist" debates. And that latter project, at least in the hands of Bennett and Woollcott, made Bond (arguably one of the most popular Cold War narratives) a way of demonstrating the limitations of literary criticism as Marxist analysis, and the importance of situated, conjunctural analysis of popular media.

11. Bennett and Woollcott, Bond and Beyond, p. 266.
12. Ibid., p. 268.
13. Ibid., p. 266.


18. Applying lessons from Lefebvre is not simply a matter of replacing a Gramscian view of the political career of a popular hero (and his media) with views that emphasize media space. But it does involve recognizing that British forms of Cultural Studies which drew upon Gramsci during the 1970s and 80s, tended not to concentrate on how his writing about the "national-popular" concerned geographic questions such as the division between Italy's North and South, the multiplicity of its regional cultures, and the international circulation of cultural forms, modes of production, and organizational rationalities. Whereas Gramsci sought to situate (Marxist) philosophy historically and geographically (i.e., a tactic for Italian Communism in the 1920s), Lefebvre sought to recast the "historical materialism" of Marxism as a spatial materialism.

21. To the extent that Bennett and Woollocott were interested in understanding the Bond phenomenon through a history of reading, how has the history of reading been integral to the circulation of spy novels through different but sometimes intersecting networks for the circulation of spy films? And how has the history of information-gathering (the domain of spy science) operated through the networks for distributing spy stories, or through the same screens (what Toby Miller has referred to as "spy screens")? See Miller, Spyscreen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
23. Foucault, "Space, Power, Knowledge."
26. Miller, Spyscreen.
27. See particularly Chapters Two and Three of Miller's Spyscreen.
29. Ibid., p. 80.
31. The 1955 Open Skies Treaty was an example of the mentality about liberalization and risk–management accompanying the space program. The pact, which was unsuccessfully proposed by the U.S. to permit flights of unarmed, surveillance airplanes over participating nation-states, reasoned that overflights were necessary for promoting confidence, predictability, stability and peace—a new international, geopolitical order exercised from above. Although the Open Skies Treaty was rejected by Russia and soon thereafter was made less relevante by orbiting communication/surveillance satellites, the treaty affirmed a logic of the emerging space program in the U.S.: that making air- and outer-space rational (knowable and regulated) was tantamount to keeping it "open," free, and democratic—even though only Russia and the U.S. actively were developing the capability to freely access and thus govern from the most open sky-zone.
32. Telesat was one demonstration of how the U.S. space program attempted to manage and act on an emerging global telecommunication network. During the early 1960s, the U.S. Information Agency also distributed various media internationally that promoted the "peaceful" intentions of
the U.S. space program, and it used personnel trained by NASA to command "spacemobiles" for promotional tours in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and India.


34. The 2008 web site for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (www.dhs.gov) includes prominent menus for citizens to learn how to manage "Prevention & Protection" and "Preparedness & Response." In that sense it is designed as a resource for self-help—for active ("interactive") citizens who take responsibility for their own safety and security, and who contribute to the current rationality for "national security" in that way.

35. For more on the relation between the current media convergence and the policy initiatives to "reinvent government," see Laurie Ouellette and James Hay, Better Living through Reality TV (London/Boston: Blackwell, 2008).


37. Ibid, p. 4.


Why is spying so persistent? In an era that fetishizes transparency, open governance, and all those neoliberal shibboleths, why do we still have spies, and why do we love their textualization on screen? Don't they represent secret governments, oppressive states, and shadowy mandarins—in short, a world of painful mistrust?

Even if we regard them as necessary evils, how can spies bring meaning through fiction?

Reading Secret Agents made me ponder these questions. After scanning the manuscript form the book you now hold in your hands, I wanted to see how the classic screen text of the espionage genre had migrated and mutated in its travels but remained popular over many decades—namely, Alfred Hitchcock's 1938 film, The Lady Vanishes. This was a test-case of the genre's durability, too. The Lady Vanishes has gone a long way since its maiden voyage, leaving a mark on everything from 21st-century politics to contemporary transportation. For the New Yorker, "The Lady Vanishes" refers to the impenetrability of Hillary Rodham Clinton's character (Kolbert, 2007). For the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, it encapsulates the absence of women's issues from debates about somatic-cell nuclear transfer and embryonic stem-cell technologies (Dickenson, 2006). The Journal of Organizational Change Management tropes the text to account for obstacles to female leaders (Hopfl and Matilal, 2007). Film Quarterly connects it to a de seated fear of women (Fischer, 1979). Remade in 1979 by Anthony Page,