Post-Global Network
and Everyday Life

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Television as Everyday Network of Government

Armand Mattelart has traced the Modern "discovery" of the network, and its relation to the "invention of communication," to multiple and intersecting sciences devoted to the health of circulatory systems which developed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. He notes that the pre-Modern use of the term "network," which signified lace-making, was rearticulated in the seventeenth-century by Italian naturalist and physician, Marcello Malpighi in reference to the flow of blood through arteries. He points out that medical science's rationalization of the human body as a circulatory system, and its conception of healthy bodies as free-flowing circulatory systems intersected with contemporaneous conceptions of "economy" by French Physiocrats, the increased reliance on systems of weights and measures to chart healthy flows, and the mapping and engineering of roads and river routes. "Communication" as healthy, free-flowing network became an object of inquiry, knowledge, and invention along these various "paths of reason." I begin with this reference in part to underscore that the history of the communication network is old (albeit Modern) and can not be understood merely as a history of communication media—unless of course one is willing (as is Mattelart) to recognize the historical genealogy of "communication." This is a lesson that becomes more pre-
scient with every exclamation that we are living with “new media” in a “network society.”

Throughout much of the twentieth century, “network” referred to a particular formation and arrangement of communication described by terms such as “mass communication” and “broadcasting.” Broadcasting was organized as national territories/zones of communication through radio (after the mid-1920s) and television (after the late 1940s). Broadcasting was financed or subsidized differently in different parts of the world (as “public” or “private” corporations), and its mission as popular cultural form became central to the production of national cultures. In the United States, broadcasting occurred through the linking of local facilities into national networks. The National Broadcast Company (NBC), a subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) which manufactured radio and phonograph products, became the first national broadcast network in 1926, followed by the Columbia Broadcast System (CBS) two years later and by the American Broadcast Company (ABC) in 1943. By the early 1950s, these three broadcast networks also operated as the three distributors of television programming in the U.S. The creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the late 1960s was rationalized as an alternative to the commercially driven objectives of the other three TV networks, though it too was structured as a national network of local “public broadcast” stations.

From the 1920s through at least the 1970s, national broadcast networks operated (albeit differently across the world) as arrangements for shaping and managing political, economic, cultural, technological, gendered, racial, and social citizenship. While these networks—this conception and organization of network—were not the only means of shaping and managing citizenship, the forms and models of citizenship that became dominant in this period relied profoundly on the network as a means of linking everyday life to what counted as civics, politics, and “government.”

Various expressions have been adopted recently to describe the passing of this twentieth-century meaning and arrangement of “network.” The term “post-network era” figures prominently in recent considerations about television’s transformations. Amanda Lotz, for instance, embraces the term (albeit cautiously) as a useful way to consider the demise of “the network era” of TV, “when ‘television’ meant the networks NBC, CBS, and ABC.” (Lotz, p. 11). Lotz rightly charts the emergence of the “post-network era” through the proliferation of cable and satellite distribution of TV after the mid-1970s (a passage from broadcasting to what some have referred to as “narrowcasting”), and she qualifies the epochalist intonation of “post”-ing a “network era,” stating that her use of the term is not intended “to suggest the death or complete irrelevance of what we have known as television networks and channels.” (p. 254) However, her account of a “post-network era,” focuses on television as a relatively discrete industry, cultural form, technology, network and history, concludes that television is still (somehow) a discrete network: “Decades later, we no longer need a separate medium to frame our understanding of television because its own historical features and distinctions now serve that function.” (p. 256) Should we accept those “historical features and distinctions” as if they simply were self-generated? The final paragraph of her book quotes Nicholas Negroponte’s statement (from 1995) that “the future of television is to stop thinking of television as television” (p. 256), but it is difficult to imagine from her account how to analyze TV by first de-centering TV as a self-perpetuating entity. Although this is a fairly insignificant point to dwell on in one respect, it bespeaks a disposition about what determines the history/transformations of a single medium such as TV and (as discussed below) it still figures into current assumptions about “media power.”

Lotz rightly notes that her use of the term “post-network era” is in some ways contradicted by the recent attractiveness of the expression “the network society” adopted by followers of Manuel Castells’ eponymous book (Castells, 1996). Castells’ conception of the “network society” is concerned more with how networks operate as distibutive apparatuses of “information” than with the legacy of broadcasting and its role in producing and distributing entertainment (Lotz’s focus). He therefore is less focused on the specificity of networks supporting a specific medium than is Lotz. Whereas Lotz concentrates on the new strategies of production, distribution, and audience measurement in an old broadcast medium, Castells is preoccupied with the new forms of productivity that rely on information technologies and networks and whose emergent footprint—a “space of flows”—favors certain centers of productivity while marginalizing other areas. However, as Lotz acknowledges, her use of the term “post-network era” is not incommensurate with Castells’ term “network society” because they both describe a historical rupture hastened by a widespread reliance on “digital media,” the Internet, and World Wide Web, whose pervasiveness in contemporary life is purportedly so thorough as to warrant the expression “network society.” For both Lotz and Castells, Nicholas Negroponte’s account of the “digital revolution” lays historiographic and theoretical groundwork for how media matter in the present because Negroponte described (and lauded) the “digital revolution” not only as breaking up broadcasting companies’ and video cassette retail companies’ control of material distributed through their networks, but also as forging a “post-information age” multi-media environment—a wedding of broadcasting and interactivity.

One solution to explaining the ramifications of the “digital revolution” and its role in transforming broadcast networks such as television’s has occurred through the expression “convergence culture.” Mark Deuze applies Castells’ rationale about the network society (rather uncritically) to map the new centers
and geography of various "creative industries" while emphasizing (more than Castells) how media play an increasingly central role in the everyday life (the "media life") and productivity (work and play) of consumers. Echoing a rationale advanced by Henry Jenkins, Deuze proposes that "the new human condition [of the network society], when seen through the lens of those in the forefront of changes in the way work and life are implicated in our increasingly participatory media culture, is convergence. . . . Media convergence [has] a cultural logic of its own, blurring the lines between production and consumption, between making media and using media, and between active and passive spectatorship of mediated culture." (Deuze, p. 74) That said, Deuze (like Castells and Lotz) attributes the current media convergence primarily to an economic logic specifically driving the production, distribution, and commercial synergy of multiple media. He argues that this logic is worth mapping because these media networks and technologies have become central to contemporary life (our "media life"), though he examines the networks of interactive consumers and "media life" mostly in terms of their value within the new geography of creative industries.

Jenkins' argument about a new "convergence culture" most energetically addresses the tension (or arrangement) between media industries' strategies for encouraging consumer participation and consumers' (particularly the most invested gamers and fans') active involvement and interactivity with the production and life of media commodities. Noting that "convergence" is "both a top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process," he states that "media companies are learning how to accelerate the flow of media content across delivery channels to expand their revenue opportunities, broaden markets, and reinforce viewer commitments [while] consumers are learning content across delivery channels to expand their revenue opportunities, broaden markets, and reinforce viewer commitments [while] consumers are learning how to use these different media technologies to bring the flow of media more fully under their control and to interact with other consumers." (p. 18) Although Jenkins implies that the culture of convergence is produced along both these paths, he occasionally poses the "grassroots" and "bottom-up" attributes of convergence culture as a counter-pressure to the commercialist strategies of "big media" industries. This latter impulse in his account of contemporary convergence culture is particularly evident when he calls out veins of critical studies about media (e.g., the work of Mark Crispin Miller, Noam Chomsky, and Robert McChesney) that have not adequately recognized how the non-professional, consumer-driven practices of "collective intelligence" and a "participatory culture" complicate their views of media power, which he sees as too oriented toward older models of media production and distribution. Though his *Convergence Culture* begins by charting the changing uptake of Negroponte's optimism about a digital revolution, he concludes his book insisting (as did Negroponte at the end of *Being Digital* ten years earlier) that "increasing participa-

ticipation in popular culture is a good thing" and something too often ignored by "critical pessimists." (p. 248)

To the extent that Jenkins ties the virtue of "participation in popular culture" to the "democratic" possibilities of a new "convergence culture" (i.e., to "the politics of participation"), media convergence is either cast as a field of political intervention overlooked by "critical pessimists" or inherently more democratic than was the broadcast era—a time purportedly before "convergence culture." Whereas Lotz's account of the "post-network era" is conducted under the slogan, "The Television will be Revolutionized," Jenkins' account of "convergence culture" reassesses the slogan, "The Revolution will not be Televised," noting that the most significant forms of political mobilization since the 2004 presidential campaign have occurred through non-professional (fan and avid consumer)-driven techniques such as Photoshopped political ads and through "grassroots" networks of activism and intervention. In this sense, TV's convergence with "new media" (its place in emergent media networks of political activism, or maybe a "network society"), and TV's engagement by consumers who are savvy about using these media/networks for personal and collective self-representation, have demonstrated what makes the current media convergence more democratic than in the past.

Although Jenkins is right to point out that today democracy is represented and practiced through the media technologies and networks that he associates with a "convergence culture," his argument tends to veer toward a universalist conception of liberal democracy and its flowering or return in a "participatory," "grassroots," non-professionalized media culture. It is one thing to point out (as does Jenkins) that "consumer communities" and media fandom involved in "grassroots" organizing helped galvanize political candidates such as Howard Dean in the 2004 presidential campaign, and another to interpret that as an indication that "community networking" simply enhances citizenship and makes for a purer form of democracy than in the past—or presumably in other parts of the world lacking these practices. Although Jenkins gestures (around the edges) to the ways that television and its linkages to web-based consumer-citizen communities can be described as what John Hartley has termed (in reference to current TV series such as *American Idol*) "democratainment" as a commercial initiative, he does not push hard enough at the contradictions surrounding the shaping and valuing of energized consumers and their "communities" (for instance, their complex role in reproducing an economy of interactivity and mass customization, as Mark Andrejevic has argued).

Without ignoring the contradictions of the agency of citizen-consumers within the economy of media "interactivity" and "participation," I want to propose an alternative to economistic accounts of media networks (e.g., Lotz, Castells, Deuze) and Jenkins' valorization of a "convergence culture" and its con-

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sumers as ushering (driving) a more democratic form of citizenship. Explaining this alternative involves moving beyond the starkly binaristic logic that pervades these accounts: ownership vs. consumption, political economy vs. (fan) culture, passivity vs. inter-/activity, control vs. resistance, government vs. community mobilization, and "critical pessimism" vs. "critical utopianism" (Jenkins' terms) as the only viable positions for explaining "media power" in the "network age" (or even a "post-network age"). While Jenkins is right that it is important to understand questions of media power, political agency, and citizenship (not just, in his terms, "the public's role in the political process") by considering how technologies and networks are produced and reproduced through "the everyday life experiences of citizens," (p. 208) one still needs to consider certain contradictions surrounding the relation of media/citizenship to the technologies and networks of government through which citizenship is shaped and directed in their everyday lives.

Moving in this latter direction involves, in part, rethinking Michel Foucault's writing about subjects, power, governmentality, biopolitics, technologies of the self, and neo-/liberalism. There are several implications of Foucault's work around this cluster of topics that the following sections of this chapter consider. First, Foucault repeatedly emphasizes that freedom is not the opposite of social control. His account of liberal government demonstrated how the "birth" of institutions oriented toward the sovereignty of the individual and toward personal liberties were accompanied in the late-18th and 19th centuries by the proliferation and dispersal of mechanisms for disciplining individuals and populations and for guiding and shaping the proper, healthy exercise of freedoms. For Foucault, liberal government was initially shaped by the tension between these two developments, and it subsequently reinvents itself in response to potential resistances and particular problems in governing this way.

Second, in considering how programs of empowerment, healing, and social care have operated as technologies of disciplinarity, and how the achievement of individualism and personal freedoms occurs through the proliferation and dispersion of the technologies of self-discipline, social welfare and security, Foucault emphasized the importance of recognizing the "micro-physics" and "micro-logics" of power—the little, everyday operations of social control. In his writing about "governmentality," he famously underscored that an analysis of liberal "government" (political modernity) did not begin and end by examining the operations of the liberal State but instead by mapping the multiplicity of the techniques and technologies of control which are administered by community, family, individuals, etc., on themselves. His view that government is practiced/enacted through everyday caring for and administering to community, family, and oneself implies that citizenship is not simply one's relation to the State but also the multi-form and daily ways that life is managed.

An analytic of government thus maps the many points of application and many varieties of technologies through which control and freedom are exercised, but also the ways that government continually anticipates and develops technologies overcoming resistances. It maps how power is exercised through networks, and dispositions within these networks. Government depends on historical and geographic "arrangements" of these networks and dispositions. The longevity of liberalism has been predicated on the anticipation of and experiments in circumventing potential breakdowns in arrangement of government, and on finding the proper and most healthy arrangements of governing through freedoms (what Nikolas Rose, after Foucault, has termed "the powers of freedom"). Whereas Mattleart charts the historical coalescence of reasonings about healthiness of unblocked, freely flowing circulatory systems and economies, Foucault underscores that these reasonings and networks became instrumental to the dispersion of the mechanisms and points of "liberal government."

What questions can be addressed by considering communication media through an analytic of the networks, technologies, and arrangements of government? Foucault's relative lack of attention to communication media and networks actually is useful in thinking about media practices because, in suggesting that power lacks a center (i.e., that it is dispersed), he proposes an analysis that must figure out how, when, and where media matter within networks and arrangements of government. That he posed his account of power and governmentality as an alternative to a Marxist political economy and to French Structuralism (the theoretical framework for ideological and deconstructionist criticism), also suggests an analytic that raises questions not typically asked in critical studies of media which have long preferred these theoretical frameworks for explaining media power. To the extent that an analytic of the everyday networks of government emphasizes the diffusion and popularity of certain sciences, protocols, and technologies of government and citizenship, it sees communication media as activated through governmental and managerial rationalities that are not limited to the communicative functions of media (and thus the ways that communication becomes, particularly for Communication Studies, the basis for understanding every question power). An analytic of everyday government thus cuts two ways: as an analysis of media industries as well as consumer-citizens who are reliant on techniques of management, and an analysis of how these privatized and personalized techniques of management operate in conjunction (or not) with policies, programs, and regulations of the State. Historically and geographically these techniques, and the networks amongst these agents, has varied—with greater and lesser degrees of a role by private (as distinct from State) agents of management. Historically broadcasting, narrowcasting, and media interactivity have been integral to liberal government in the U.S. through these changing arrangements of management and government; networks of everyday
government act on and through these regimes of communication media, though not primarily or exclusively through them. In that the recent stage of liberal government (a so-called “neo-liberalism”), which has encouraged greater reliance on privatizing public services, has intersected with a “post-network era,” a “network society,” and a “convergence culture,” it is important to understand how media such as television operate within this governmental arrangement and rationality as a perspective as much about current liberal government as about the current convergence of media.

In proceeding this way, my chapter taps and rethink the important literature about television’s relation to everyday life—studies that emerged since the 1980s, amidst the decline of the broadcast model and its relation to a stage of liberal government. I examine how television (in its relation to other media) is instrumentalized as technology and network of everyday government and through rationalities and programs oriented to governing everyday life, producing and authorizing particular forms of citizenship. While television or other Modern communication media have never been discrete networks of government, their operation within governmental rationalities has imbued them with relatively specific objectives in daily life. Programs and rationalities of government also have objectified them as the source of particular problematic behaviors in need of correction (e.g., TV as having spawned a nation of “couch potatoes”). It may be useful to conceptualize television (as an industry, technology, or cultural form) that was separate from cinema and radio during an age of broadcasting, or to discuss the convergence of contemporary media; however, it is just as important to develop an analysis of media/powers that situates the practice and virtue of separation and convergence, as well as the spirit of invention and modernization associated with “new media,” within rationalities and programs of government and citizenship. Citizenship and government are enacted daily, partly through media technologies and networks, and certainly not only as the result of media consumers’ information-gathering or monitoring about public/political affairs.

**REINVENTING TELEVISION AS A NETWORK OF GOVERNMENT:**

**DOT.GOV THROUGH DOT.ORG AND DOT.COM**

What is liberal citizenship through the current arrangements of managing life everyday, and how do communication media matter as technologies of citizenship and government? I want to address these two questions by focusing on television not only because, as demonstrated by nearly all of the authors whose views I have cited in the first section (with the exception of Castells), the broadcasting model of television has been repurposed within an environment of convergence, but also because the current discourses about “media convergence” almost never pose questions such as these. Without setting aside television’s technological reinvention, its cross-media commercial alignments and strategies, and its encouragement/requirement of greater consumer interactivity, this section (and the one that follows it) take up three considerations for thinking about how television matters within the current rationality about liberal government and citizenship.

The first consideration has to do with television as a network of government. As Laurie Ouellette and I have noted, television’s reinvention within the current media convergence has occurred through a governmental discourse and policy initiatives that valorized “the reinvention of government” as a basis for a broad rethinking and remodeling of the “welfare state.” “Reinventing government” is not simply our own figure of speech; it is an expression that Bill Clinton absorbed in 1992 from David Osborne and Ted Gabler’s book (from that same year), *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. The term was acted on—developed, under certain historical conditions—as a “discursive formation” and as integral to a new (“neo-liberal”) rationality about government and citizenship. The impetus to “reinvent government” rested upon a paradoxical aspiration of “neo-liberalism” by economists and managerialists such as Peter Drucker who, in the wake of resurgent interest in the writings of economist Friedrich von Hayek, cited Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as evidence of a malaise resulting from the “diminishment” of individual freedoms at the hands of government intervention. For Drucker and von Hayek, liberalism needed to be renewed by “returning” to the practices that preceded what they viewed as expanding bureaucracies and the swelling size of public welfare programs.

This vision of “the entrepreneurial spirit” transforming the public sector through “public-private partnerships” informed various “reforms” and policies, the reasoning about government’s reinvention both deepened dramatically and took slightly new directions during the Bush administration. Its Faith-based and Community Initiatives, the USA Freedom Corps Volunteer Network, the Volunteers for Prosperity, the Citizen Corps, and Homeland Security all developed out of (and sometimes away from) Clinton’s National Partnership for Reinventing Government, initiated in the first year of his presidency. During the Bush administration, federal contracts with industry doubled from just over two hundred million in 2001 to over four hundred and fifty million in early 2008, with outsourcing becoming a normal practice for State agencies from the Forest Service to the CIA. Rearticulating the connotations of the idea of “public service,” i.e., a service provided by the State but also a citizen’s or company’s responsibility to provide social assistance through not-for-profit programs, thus became a fundamental objective of this governmental rationality.

The virtue of the “public-private partnership” has a longer history in U.S.
broadcasting than in other countries whose system of broadcasting developed as State-subsidized public services. Certainly U.S. television's long history of commercially sponsored broadcasting operated as a fertile basis for rationalizing at the end of the twentieth century the virtue of privatized provision of social welfare. But from the early years of TV broadcasting in the U.S., television had played a role in shaping and rewarding proper forms of citizenship, as in Mr. Citizen (1955) which showcased ordinary people who came to the assistance of needy individuals and who were given a "Mister Citizenship Award" by a "prominent American." There are other examples throughout U.S. television history of series that designed specific broadcasts in support of a specific federal program. And, as Ouellette has explained, the creation of a Public Broadcasting Corporation in the late 1960s launched a television network that governmentalyzed the cultural instruction necessary for healthy citizenship (Ouellette, 2002). However, it is no small coincidence that recent television particularly the Reality TV syndrome and the forms of media programming and convergence which support it developed within the discourse and policy-initiatives about "reinventing government," and with considerable energy during the Bush era. A prominent vein of the post-broadcast era involved the proliferation of instructional programming in networks such as Discovery Channel, The Learning Channel, Home & Garden Network, The Weather Channel, and The Food Channel, which are devoted entirely to specialized topics, and in numerous other cable networks which are not primarily devoted to instructional formats. More than in the past, this vein of television's linkage to web resources has made it a vital part of the networks' sustaining the public-private partnerships and their new arrangement of "public service" through which liberal government has staged its "reinvention." One of the most durable Reality TV series since early in the Bush administration has been Extreme Makeover: Home Edition (EM:HE), which premiered in the spring of 2003. The series selects individuals who are judged "worthy" of recognition typically because they are paragons of care-giving for family, neighborhood, or community, and because their form of private, individualized social service could be enhanced had they the resources which the series provides them. Usually the series' provision of assistance involves the renovation of their house, often because the house doubles as a setting for privately administered care-giving—the household as a zone of welfare between business and charity, as when EM:HE refurbishes the property of the Hill family who has used their farm as a boxing training facility for underprivileged youth. The series' material rewards to its subjects always are represented as philanthropic—corporate philanthropy rewarding/assisting unrecognized and deserving providers of welfare. Some episodes reward individuals who already are working with government sectors such as the military that are being transformed through increased reliance on "outsourcing." The series' second episode began this trend by staging a "home makeover" for a family comprised of a father whose National Guard unit had been sent to Iraq. At a time when furloughs for enlisted personnel were non-existent and National Guard units were being activated because of a shortage of regular army units, the series' producers struck an agreement with the Defense Department to permit the soldier-father to return in order to participate in improving a house into which his family had just moved before his activation to Iraq. In an episode involving the Cooper family, the series adds their own corporate "honors" on a disabled veteran of an Iraq campaign who has been "working with Congress" to improve veterans benefits.

As Lotz notes, television's "post-network era" has involved a realignment of local stations to the national networks. Whereas the four national networks formed licensing agreements with local affiliates, local TV stations now have begun to venture into new strategies that make them less dependent on the national networks, as cable and satellite networks rely on cable providers rather than local networks. However, series such as EM:HE which are distributed through one of the old national networks also assume a relation to localities that is congruent with the federalist orientations such as Disney's governmental rationality. Often rationalized as respecting "states' rights" and as "freeing" localities from national "bureaucracy," federalism valorizes the importance of decentralizing governmental administration, not only cultivating corporate administrators of public services but also off-loading administration onto states and municipalities. The Bush administration's response to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for instance, cast the federal government as "supporter" of state and local responders and non-profits such as the Red Cross, eventually outsourcing tasks to private contractors. Through this governmental arrangement, EM:HE produced an episode just before Christmas 2005 in which Laura Bush (having declared publicly that EM:HE was her favorite TV show) accompanied the usual cast of the series' renovation technicians to Mississippi to rebuild a house which had been damaged by the hurricane and which required special facilities for the family's Down Syndrome son. The series emphasizes its role in mediating the organization of and compensation for the army of local, "grass-roots" samaritan-providers, as its website represents linkages to local non-profits or local chapters of national ones. Mostly through its website, ABC touts EM:HE as the ridgepole of its Better Community initiative, providing an archive of links to descriptions of past episodes as well as the non-profits and public service providers that either were represented in the episode or whose relevance to a type of relief the episode demonstrated. For instance, the Better Community links for the episode about the Gaudet family whose house was damaged by the hurricane include the
United Easter Seals, United Cerebral Palsey, the National Association for Down Syndrome, and the Down Syndrome Society of Mobile County (where the episode was set). Links for the Cooper family episode include Disabled American Veterans, the Warrior Intern Network, Helping a Hero, and Homes for Our Troops. Although Lotz and Jenkins would be right to note that, characteristic of the cross-media merchandising and embedded promotional strategies of contemporary TV, EM:HE rewards its exemplary citizens with products provided by the advertising sponsors of the episode (such as Sears/Kenmore products), even these product references are stitched into the series’ demonstration of the philanthropy that operates within the governmental rationality sanctioning public-private partnerships. The Better Community website’s list of participating and “spotlighted” organizations (described in the website as its “partners”) includes a link at the bottom of the list for its parent-company Disney’s “outreach” initiatives.

While the website purports that the series is one engine for “building a better community, one family, one house, one donation at a time,” the website represents a good and healthy community as a network of “partnership” between non-profits and corporate-sponsored welfare. Materially, television is instrumentalized within that network. More than the TV series, the website collectivizes, mediates, and valorizes a network of privatized public service, though the website’s capacity to enact network as private partnership (a “better community”) depends on this vein of Reality TV, which provides a technical demonstration of the shaping of productive citizenship within the Better Community network of web-based linkages. EM:HE belongs to Reality TV genres (on ABC and other TV networks) that have privatized the provision of various forms of welfare and catalyzed a civic responsiveness (Better Communities and their good citizens) through these network-partnerships, though the generic conventions of these TV series are not simply representational; they include a set of technical conventions such as web-links and interactive mechanisms—a convention found in the former ABC series Oprah’s Big Give and its website’s links to her Angel Network of social helping, or Fox’s American Idol Gives Back and its website’s links for donations and to its network of corporate partners.

Typically, the link between State and privatized televised administration of public services is not formalized; indeed its formalization would contradict the governmental reasoning and arrangement that accept outsourcing and “partnership” as a natural extension of the historically limited role of the State in U.S. broadcasting and “free TV.” The NASA channel thus operates within NASA’s longstanding hybridity/ambiguity as a State program heavily dependent on contracted labor, services, and research. The Weather Channel’s claim to be the “nation’s premier provider of weather information” (http://www.weather.com/aboutus/?from=footer) relies on and sometimes invokes the authority of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Weather Service (both overseen by the U.S. Commerce Department), but only during crises (extreme weather and emergencies) does the Weather Channel foreground and formalize its relation to the National Weather Service, or do National Weather Service broadcasts preempt or visually become part of (through flashing warnings and banners) Weather Channel broadcasting. The “non-profit” C-Span (subsidized and overseen by a consortium of cable companies) operates through an arrangement to broadcast, and more recently distribute, on-line, congressional proceedings. And as federal courts have slowly begun to allow the presence of video cameras in courtrooms, the TruTV Channel (formerly Court TV) has produced and broadcast programs about court cases, frequently using extended video footage from courtrooms and police case work.

Though there are numerous examples of these private networks providing a public service or welfare, their status as public servicers can not be attributed only to their ubiquity in replacing or reinventing services once administered by the State, in however limited a capacity that once occurred. The rationality of a public-private partnership emphasizes the “supportive” role that the State is supposed to play—not being the primary provider of welfare but encouraging, rewarding, and (in that way) stitching itself into and acting on private networks of social service. In addition to Laura Bush’s appearance on EM:HE, the Bushes appeared in a supportive posture as part of the Idol Gives Back broadcasts. In that the websites for State agencies during the Bush administration such as the Department of Homeland Security, the program for Cyber-security, and the Department of Health & Human Services provided links to private “partners” (corporations and non-profits), these networks linked State networks to partners also identified on the television websites. In that sense, the TV linkages can disavow their relation to the State (a longstanding disposition of “free television”), while reproducing a network of provision and government. There certainly are significant examples of the State’s initiation of the public-private partnerships involving television and related media. The Bush administration’s Homeland Security created “information networks” with localities and “private partners,” and the Bush Economic Development Agency staged “telecasts” over “government networks” of video demonstrating the possible interfaces of public and commercial entities in networks of “economic development.” More commonly, however, Reality TV productions such as the ones cited are the creative engines of public service, designing and performing the partnership, as the State inserts itself into, and acts through, these private (commercial or non-profit) networks of welfare and government.

While the Department of Homeland Security’s “outreach” once relied upon news services to disseminate its famously color-coded alerts, its web site during the Bush administration was its primary means of relaying citizens to fed-
eral, state, municipal, private, non-profit, and self-services. In January 2009 ABC’s Homeland Security, USA (HS,USA) fashioned the U.S. as televisual “homeland” administered as a partnership between ABC and the Department of Homeland Security, and as a product and market that are managed by both the ABC and Homeland Security brands. ABC’s website for its HS,USA claimed that the series is unprecedented because its producers were granted special access to various Homeland Security agencies and because it transports viewers to the “front lines” of these agencies’ operations: “The epic landscape” of “America’s[sic] borders . . . a territory that includes airports, seaports, land borders, international mail centers, the open seas, mountains, deserts and even cyberspace.” The map of the nation offered by HS,USA was, at least in the initial episodes, an interminable border region—a zone that deepened or reinvented Reality TV’s games of surveillance (of being watched and watching oneself) and Reality TV’s citizenship games (tests and trials of belonging or being kicked off the island). This map represented the U.S. as a gated community (sniffing out clues on the game board). Like other Reality TV series that have mapped the nation through popular-contest (controversial series such as ABC’s Welcome to the Neighborhood, more successful ones such as The Amazing Race, or national events such as American Idol, HS,USA’s competition at that hour), HS, USA deployed its own panel of experts who decided who can pass—who wins and who loses the citizenship game.

While HS,USA was a form of “publicity” (advertisement and public service information) or even, in stronger terms, propaganda for Homeland Security, these descriptions rest on complicated and changing relations between the residual forms of citizenship left over from television’s past as a broadcast medium, and the self-directed forms of citizenship accompanying television’s reinvention through the interactive economies of web-sites. They also rest on the emergent way that the technologies for membership in private “communities” (whether gated communities or on-line varieties such as those routinely provided on TV websites like ABC’s and HS,USA) are becoming the technologies of citizenship in sovereign territories.

A TV franchise that most vividly and notoriously underscores the historical contradictions of television’s production or mediation of the public-private partnership was the NBC and MSNBC series, To Catch a Predator (2004–2008). The series worked with a non-profit on-line watchdog foundation, Perverted Justice, which monitors “predatorial” behaviors over the Internet, and with state and municipal law-enforcement agencies, in order to stage sting operations which lure men to the house of an underaged girl-agent in order to elicit an on-camera confession which will result in the man’s arrest. The staging of these entrapments, confessions, and arrests involves Perverted Justice’s reporting suspects to the show’s producers, and the producers arranging with local law enforcers to hide at the house in order to secure the premises and subsequently make the arrest. The series’ producers made arrangements with law enforcement agencies in numerous localities in the U.S. during the life of the series. In all cases, the local government became a partner in financing the staged event, having to pay police to participate in the sting operation. In some cases, the series’ recorded material became evidence in subsequent prosecutions of the entrapped offenders—in some instances leading to convictions and in other instances leading to the case’s dismissal because of the indicted individual’s entrapment. Indeed the series represented the contradictions of a federalism which assumed the efficacy of public-private partnerships—a national TV production mobilizing and sometimes undoing local rules and their local adjudication.

The producers of NBC’s Dateline followed To Catch a Predator with the series The Wanted (July 2009) which, according to NBC’s press release for the series, assembled “an elite team with backgrounds in intelligence, unconventional warfare and investigative journalism” in their quest to assure that “justice is served” to suspects designated as terrorists by the Bush administration. The group’s on-screen organizer professes to have been part of a private association tracking terrorists internationally, and the other members of the group are former U.S. Army and Navy special operations soldiers or employees of State agencies—all now working as private players (in and out of Reality TV). Their quest involves presenting evidence to (and badgering) foreign governments whose systems of justice are made to appear to have failed in apprehending suspects living under their jurisdiction. Although the series’ serving of justice does not ostensibly coordinate with agencies of the U.S. government, the series is perfectly compatible with the trend toward outsourcing during the Bush administration’s “war on terror” and in the current regime of global governmentalities. The series operates within a network of mediation between judicial and policing agencies and private agents whose precedent is established as much by prior TV franchises such as To Catch a Predator as by the governmental rationality sanctioning the outsourcing of international security enforcement through companies such as the Blackwater/Xe Corporation (paid millions of dollars by the Bush administration as a security force to aid the U.S. Army in apprehending “terrorists” in and “securing” occupied Iraq).

Thinking about Reality TV’s networks of government through these examples highlights how the realism of the Reality TV productions has to do not simply with their documentalist aesthetic but with their technical demonstrations (through a network linking television and web resources) of public-private networks of government, and with their creative/generic design of the proper (and
The Personalization & Everydayness of TV's Networks of Government

While the prior section dwells on some of the ways that television has been reinvented to mediate dot.gov, dot.com, and dot.org networks (networks of private government and welfare), this section briefly addresses how television's reinvention and place in the current networks of government depend on and increasingly require individualized, customized technologies for managing/governing various aspects of one's life and lifestyle. It is too simplistic to say that the primary agents in these networks are corporations and non-profits working on behalf of and encouraged by a political rationality, particularly since this rationality stresses the importance of personal responsibility and enterprise. However it is also too simplistic to say, as I believe Jenkins does, that the participatory technologies available to TV viewers (particularly when aggregated into "grass-roots communities") merely encourage or produce a more democratic citizenship than the old broadcast networks. Jenkins' perspective ignores the injunction to self-enterprise in the governmental rationality through which a "convergence culture" developed, and his perspective ignores the way that the virtue of free-choice, interactivity, and self-enterprise are objectified (made rational and a desired outcome) through citizens'/consumers' imbrication in the networks of government that television mediates. This section, therefore, considers the strategies of personalization and programmatization through which television (in its relation to these networks of government) has authorized a citizenship (one's relation to a governmental rationality and arrangement) that is free to choose, individualized, interactive, enterprising, and self-managed.

Foucault's reassessment of the liberal conception of self-government in terms of the history of the care of the self is instructive on this point. He argues that liberalism's valorization of individualism and freedom occurred through the multiplication of private authorities, institutions, programs, and technologies which objectify (make rational and knowable) and normalize various activities and behaviors. The technologies of government, which are dispersed through life in a particular time and place and which aim to make life healthy, not only work to discipline free individuals but assume (as Foucault emphasized in his latter work) a free subject with the capacity to act ethically—to govern her-or-his-self properly. Beginning with the daily regimens of the Stoics, Foucault sketches the long history of "the care of the self," considering some of the ways that individuals have put and kept themselves on the right, healthy track through techniques for administering to oneself. Foucault follows the Stoic's practice of diary-keeping through Christian prayer and penitence, and subsequently through Modern scientific technologies of self-administration. With the birth of liberal government, becoming a subject who is self-governing thus involved mastering various "technologies of the self" and living one's life (everyday, everywhere) through a healthy regimen—the avoidance of excess and the measured, proper exercise of freedom.

Foucault's historical perspective about technologies of the self, self-writing, and care of the self is helpful in thinking about how media in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries operate in relation to the governmental rationalities and arrangements of liberalism, just as his historicism reminds us that liberalism cannot be generalized (historically or geographically) and that it always is necessary to understand the liberal State and liberal government up through these technologies of self-government and citizenship. This perspective is particularly useful in thinking about the transition or conversion in the U.S. from the broadcasting technologies of citizenship (everyday programming for a national audience) to the emergence of technologies of citizenship that developed in the current regime of media convergence and Reality TV and that have been marked by an economy of mass customization and interactivity. While it would be simplistic to paint this transformation in too broad strokes, suggesting that the practice of public-partnerships were unprecedented before the Reagan years and the ascendency of cable and satellite era, that viewers of television during the broadcast era never "interacted" with television programming, or that certain models and technologies of citizenship from the broadcast era are absent from the current rationality and (media) networks of government, there are important ways that the television-Web nexus has been organized to provide the resources for and encourage the formation of a citizenship that takes responsibility and shows enterprise in governing/caring for her/himself.

One vivid example of this trend is the ABC series, Shaq's Big Challenge (2006–2007). This series follows the quest of series co-producer and NBA bas-

most lucrative) networks for mediating these partnerships. In that sense, Reality TV is not so much an example par excellence of a "postmodern aesthetic's" blurring of the difference between the Real and its representation as it is the production of the networks of government as public-private partnership. To the extent that these TV productions are "game-docs" or "docu-dramas," they confer an institutional history of the technical objectivity ascribed to the State agencies of liberal democracies (entities of rules and laws for making rational and objective government administration) onto various private and non-profit agents of government. As demonstrations and exercises in government as public-private partnership, the productions also are experiments (tests and contests) for demonstrating that privatized networks are viable media for administering the services associated with public institutions. In this dynamic, the work of the private and the State agents objectify (take as their object and act through) the rules of one another's operations.
basketball star, Shaquille O'Neal as he contemplates how to redress the "problem of child obesity." The series begins with O'Neal, as citizen, trying to figure out who can help him solve the problem. After weighing the resources available through "the halls of government," he eventually consults technical experts from the private sector, some of whom refer him to others. Galvanized by their knowledge about the problem, he then decides to assemble a "dream team" of experts (a fitness trainer, a child obesity specialist, and a professional nutritionist) to help him help seven children whom the series represents as "at risk" because of their size. The series title thus refers to the challenge of aiding these children (i.e., of governing their "unhealthy" conduct and physical size) but also to the challenge of managing the problem through the formation of a public-private network of authorities. The series charts the progress of both the kids and Shag's team, as each episode sets the kids through a series of tests and contests aimed at instilling in them the confidence to help themselves. Like many Reality TV series that represent personal makeover as a "life intervention," this one deploys a mentor (in this case a celebrity citizen who relies on experts) literally to re-shape his subjects as self-directed, self-caring, and enterprising citizens. The series represents itself as bringing the children into a good and healthy network from which they have previously been excluded, in part (as pointed out in the first episode) because many of them have become obese/unhealthy watching too much of the wrong television, spending too much time on-line, or over-indulging in video games. In all these respects, Shag's Big Challenge implicitly reflects on and represents itself as mediating a good and healthy media network.

Although the series mobilizes "private citizens" to provide a form of welfare, the series' references to the role of the State, corporate, and non-profit entities is significant. The corporate sponsors of the series' premiere episode were predominantly interactive media companies (Verizon, Sprint, AT&T), private insurance providers (Gieco and Safe Auto), and pharmaceutical companies and brands (Pfizer, Celebrex, Lunesta), even though the children's treatment never explicitly mentions their need for a pharmacological regimen. As in The Biggest Loser which designs televisural regimens (test and contests) for subjects deemed over-sized and unhealthy, and within the conventions of other ABC series whose life interventions mobilize private networks of public service. However, what makes this series different from many of the examples discussed in the prior section is its demonstration of civic involvement by a celebrity/exemplary citizen who reflects on the limits of his expertise in order to call forth a network of private practitioners—a facet of the series that makes it more like Extreme Makeover: Home Edition. Moreover, Shag's private odyssey, staged publically through this network of private practitioners, as well as Reality TV technicians, demonstrates a pathway that individuals can follow in order to become productive agents in a network of public service and welfare. In this sense, the series (at different levels, for different actor/agents) is about self-governing citizens and their networks. The kids must become enterprising under the guidance of Shaq's entrepreneurialism; ABC and the series' sponsors act on their enterprise, while federal and state government enter both as Shaq's supporters but also as institutions that he (the series and network) must mobilize into the proper arrangement (i.e., public-private partnership). In this arrangement, good government thus depends on the actions of citizens and the support of the State. The citizen's self-awareness leads to producing a network of self-governing actors whose activity and network in turn help make the State aware of its resources.

More than many of the series discussed in the prior section, this one organizes the links between television programming and a network of Web-links in order to maximize this chain of enterprise and self-governing actors. While the series was on the air, its ABC website provided a special link to a related site, "Shag's Big Family Challenge" (http://www.shagsfamilychallenge.com/public-site/funnellindex.aspx). From that site, viewers could link to the .gov websites for Bush's "President's Fitness Challenge" (http://www.presidentschallenge.org/) and the President's Council on Fitness (http://www.fitness.gov/), the latter a site with multiple links from a menu (similar to ABC's Better Community site) of corporate and non-profit participants in the council. Just as importantly, the website provides various customizable resources for managing one's health through the series' TV-web nexus. Viewers who watch the program can become inter-actively involved in managing a problem identified and overseen through this public-private network, tapping into toolkits and score-cards for making
one's family, children, and self more accountable (or accountable within this rationality of government). The website for Shaq's Family Challenge, which has lingered after the cancellation of the TV series, provided a link in 2009 for the Everyday Health Network (http://www.everydayhealth.com/), a web-engine and company oriented entirely toward customizing a daily health regimen, finding experts who can address personal health problems, and connecting with non-profit and commercial "partners." In this respect, the series' website is like the self-managed websites for "lifestyle management" that insurance providers have increasingly encouraged for their policyholders in order to keep their customers less "at risk," as the bodies and accounts which these companies oversee: www.lifestylemanagement.healthlink.com. The website's linkage to an everyday "health network" (whose motto is "today's the day") not only moves the dailyness of the TV regimen into the daily life and technical capacities of the interactive subject, transforming the old idea of the "TV program" into one that is self-starting and self-directing, but it also technically mediates and helps produce a network from television to the web resources for managing one's lifestyle.

To become fit, through Shaq's or Bush's "challenge," involves becoming an interactive, enterprising actor in this network—able to care for oneself, but through the technical resources necessary for full-fledged citizenship that the current complex of networks of government make possible. As a self-authorizing network, Shaq's Big Challenge works to assemble multiple authorities (public and private) who assist and authorize a citizen-subject to take control of her or his own life—to become a freely operating authority about his or her self, in a network of provision that expects citizens to get fit and take care of themselves, and thus to break the shackles of their unhealthy dependence on the State.

Citizenship, as a technical achievement through these networks of government, not only entails becoming aware (arguably the old idea of citizenship in the broadcast era) but actively technologizing oneself through daily "challenges" and tests administered through networks of government that represent themselves as part of everyday life and as arbiters/providers of private communities of citizens. It is no small coincidence that the websites for television networks or his own life—to become a freely operating authority about his or her self, in a network of provision that expects citizens to get fit and take care of themselves, and thus to break the shackles of their unhealthy dependence on the State.

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The Legacy of the Public-Private Network, and Barack's Big Challenge

The website for the recent Bravo and NBC series, Parks & Recreation (2009), a comedy of local government in a fictional Indiana city, provides interactive links to the program and to other commercial websites that attach their marketing campaign to NBC's. The series chronicles the efforts of Leslie Knope, the deputy director of the city's Parks and Recreation Department (played by Amy Poehler), as she navigates the procedures, policies, and networks of city government. While Knope is a paragon of the enterprising ethic operating within the halls of government, she never justifies her own behavior and agenda in quite the same way as one of her superiors who lectures her in the first episode about the virtue of public-private partnerships as a remedy to anything. In the first episode, Knope declares at a meeting with citizens that she intends to mobilize the resources of city government to build a public park on land abandoned by a private developer. Part of the series' humor results from the daffiness and even delusional quality of Knope's wide-eyed confidence that a public service can be so easily provided, especially when her confidence is played against the dysfunctionality of government administration and the rampant cynicism of citizens about whether government ever works for them. That the series derives humor from a deep cynicism about whether government ever works affirms a premise central to the recent liberal political rationality which called forth the public-private partnership, even as the series documents (a la Michael Moore) the bizarreness of that rationality and the failure of "reinvented government" to provide a substantively better alternative—particularly in a small city that increasingly is expected to provide services with limited State resources and to display
an entrepreneurialism in lining up private, contracted providers. The rationality of recent liberal government's valorization of the public-private partnership assumes, after all, that local government knows best how to deliver social services, that the private sector can manage services better than can the State, and that citizens are freed from the "iron cage" of bureaucracy through the heroes and generosity of corporate and non-profit philanthropy.

There is therefore something completely familiar and ironic that the series' official website provides links to a website for the government offices of the fictional Pawnee. The home page of Pawnee's website follows the generic conventions of real city government websites: its heading is emblazoned with the motto, "My Hometown," underneath which is a menu of links for the city's various departments, such as Business, Public Safety, Information & Technology, Arts & Culture, Transportation, and Parks & Recreation. How should one consider the relation of Pawnee's website to those of gated communities whose private government administrations have had to develop policies and regulations about the disruptions attributed to the staging of Reality TV series in their community property. Given the examples discussed above, there are reasons to expect that Pawnee may not be the last effort to reinvent the government of cities through the technical resources provided by television's current reinvention through the Web.

I mention this series as part of the Conclusion because its ambiguities bespeak a possible sea-change in the arrangement and rationality authorizing the everyday networks of government discussed in the prior. Although TV syndrome flourished as part of the most energetically designed programs of the history of "reinventing government" predates the Bush administration, it is no small coincidence that the networks of government attendant to the Reality administration's version of the President's Council on Fitness? Should we see a series which aired in the first months of the Obama administration, such as HS, USA or The Wanted, as anomalies in the current context (throwbacks to conventions and networks that are unraveling and no longer viable) or as a testament to the rootedness of this rationality in Obamaland? What has a "public plan" for healthcare (and accusations of its relation to a "new socialism") to do with "Barack's Big Challenge"—with the Obama Administration's provision of healthcare (and mobilizing healthcare reform) through the everyday networks and technologies of public-private partnership and of the care of the self that have formed during the previous eight years? What would it take, against the legacy of "reinventing government," to demonstrate the inefficacy, incompleteness, and inequalities of everyday networks of self-government that have sought to demonstrate and normalize their utility in empowering citizens to help themselves?

One of the signature events of the Obama administration's inauguration was the telecast, "We Are One: An Inaugural Celebration from the Lincoln Memorial," produced and distributed by HBO on January 18, 2009. Although the event tapped into the legacy of "grassroots" and "popular" demonstrations set since the 1960s along the Memorial's reflecting pool, this event's production and distribution by the largest pay-cable network attested to the importance of the public-private network of government from which the Obama administration technically was born. It served as a hallmark of a "post-broadcast era," when a national-popular civic event's "broadcast" occurred televisually through a pay-subscription service that allowed cable franchises to distribute the event publicly "free of charge." HBO also made the event available through its website, HBO.com, at a time when HBO had begun extending some of its live programming (e.g., "Real Time with Bill Maher"—www.hbo.com/billmaher/) through on-line venues. HBO allowed National Public Radio to air the event, thus providing a relatively unprecedented linkage between PBS and TV subscription services. And HBO re-ran the event as part of its subscription-TV service for another month, when the telecast operated as a hybrid form of public philanthropy and programming for HBO's taste culture. Although the event was a celebration of political change—a display of citizenship and civic pride surrounding popular performers and entertainment companies performing without ostensible financial compensation—the meaning and mattering of "we are one" attest to both the flexibility and rootedness of the networks of government through which television is (re-)organized in a "post-broadcast era."

The flexibility and rootedness of these networks of government make it wrong to imagine that "Barack's Big Challenge" simply involves overcoming the Bush-Cheney Administration's promotion of an Ownership Society or that period's do-it-yourself technologies of Reality TV which supported those policies. In conjunction with having signed a "Serve America Act" (April 2009) and following its announcement (February 2009) that it would "expand" the Bush Administration's Faith-based & Community Initiative, the Obama
Administration began promoting its “United We Serve” program alongside week-long campaigns such as National Volunteer Week. The promotion and administration of these programs occurred partly through the Obama Administration’s United We Serve website (www.serve.gov and www.volunteer.gov), whose title banner states: “The President is calling on all Americans to participate in our nation’s recovery and renewal by serving in our communities... America’s new foundation will be built one community at a time—and it starts with you.” Its claim of “renewal” stands in an important relation to “recovery,” not simply as a broad, civic response to “economic recovery” but also to recovering and building on/through the established networks for administering welfare as public-private partnership. The National Volunteer Week’s sponsors in April 2009 were both the United We Serve program and the corporate and non-profit coalition of the Points of Light Institute/Network, created under George H.W. Bush and merged in 2007 with the Hands On Network. While the Hands On Network website prominently lists a menu of its corporate sponsors, the United We Serve site lists a menu of state-based agencies and programs (e.g., AmeriCorp) that incentivize volunteerism, represent a point of interface between public and private “partnership,” and provide technical resources for citizen participation. Furthermore, alongside this latter menu, The United We Serve website also prominently displays its network’s connection to new media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and “Serve.gov Mobile” (the new presence of the state in the emergent complex of what Jenkins and others see as “grassroots” media).

In conjunction and “partnership” with the birth and reinvention of these programs, EM:HE produced a broadcast whose introduction promoted itself as one staging area for National Volunteer Week—as part of a new season of the series which could hitch itself to Obama Administration initiatives as those initiatives acted on, renewed, and recovered the recent history of public-private partnership and volunteeristic programs comprising the residual networks of government. The episode of EM:HE thus rationalizes its latest outreach in terms of National Volunteer Week, even as it in turn contributes to a governmental rationality about the value of citizens (such as the Montgomery family showcased in the episode) who abandon “the fast-track” of personal financial gain in order to serve community through a life of volunteerism (for those disenfranchised from any “track” through the financial crisis)—service hindered only, it would seem, by the lack of the technical resources linking that family and community (those citizens) to the more robust networks of government such as United We Serve and thousand Points of Light. This renewing, renewable, recovering, and recoverable network of government (a synergy between the public and private mobilization of civic activism) acts on the past arrangement even as it rearticulates and reinvents the technical demonstrations and the reasoning about outreach and care.

CONCLUSION—“WE ARE ONE” (OMNES ET SINGULATIM) IN THE POPULAR RATIONALITIES & NETWORKS OF GOVERNMENT?

As noted in the Introduction to this chapter, Foucault explained the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century’s birth of liberal government not simply in terms of the formation and concentration/expansion of the State’s administrative apparatus but in terms of the “power of individualization” occurring through the proliferation and individualization of the technologies of control, discipline, and securitization. In his late lecture/essay, “Omnes et singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” he discussed this power of individualization (the government of the self) as having multiple administrators, including the relation of the individual to her/himself—the self as an ethical substance which is worked on one’s entire life. “Omnes” (the every-body) is thus managed through the work, care, and individualized power and technologies of the self.

Against this long (albeit Modern) history of liberal government, there is one other implication of “We Are One” that is worth considering, by way of a Conclusion (and an opening onto further questions and studies about “everyday networks of government” in the current historical conjuncture). This chapter’s concern with television’s place in everyday networks of government, and these networks’ role in (re-)shaping forms of citizenship, focuses on how these networks are authorized through a political rationality of the “public-private partnership”—a reasoning about limiting the role of State government while catalyzing local (state and municipal) administration, corporate and non-profit institutions, and the enterprise and self-responsibilization of citizens. To the extent that the HBO production’s title represents national collectivity as “we the people,” and in that sense casts its production as a public good/service and a popular political representation, how should we reconcile that with the localization, privatization, and individualization of power and government valorized through the current (“neo-liberal”) governmental rationality and the technological regime of the everyday networks of government which this chapter considers as having been renewed, reinvented, and/or recovered from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration? Might a more useful way of thinking about the production’s role in ceremonially/ritually marking the transformation of liberal government in the U.S. and in inaugurating President Obama’s policy initiatives involve recognizing how the production acts on the profoundly individualized regime/economy (the everyday networks) of “popular rationalities” and “popular technologies” for administering government and citizenship—the collective “we” of a “popular culture” mobilized as through the personalization, customization, and “interactivization” of collectivization and the “popular”? This is the technological regime through which broadcast media such as television (as “popular” media and “public” service) have been reinvented polit-
Within the ceremonial ritual of inauguration (the political protocols of nation­
who feel incomplete, searching for something to make them feel whole.” Like
vision scenes of the Martin Luther King rally at the Lincoln Memorial) with
al revival) than the everyday rituals of the television program, and the current
televisual technologies of individuation and individualization. It is still, for all
its implication in the rationality of the public-private partnership, a popular spec­
tacle that rearticulates a national-popular history and civic-subjectivity before a
mass audience—on TV and in front of the TV set. It acts upon the past from the
current regime of interactivity—assembling the we, reconfiguring a link between
the nation and the people, in part by mixing old newsreel footage (e.g., old tele­
vision scenes of the Martin Luther King rally at the Lincoln Memorial) with live
musical performances demonstrating the potential to overcome the market and
cultural differences of musical taste.

A new television series from 2009 that more strategically reconstitutes a col­
lectivity through the power of individualization and through television’s every­
day networks of government is the ABC series *Find My Family*. Premiering in late
2009, the series deploys expert “researchers” to “sift through archives and track
down records” in order to help individuals and individual families piece

and cultural differences of musical taste.

The problem with a study claiming to be global is just as problematic as one that generalizes liberalism in terms of the “neo,” particularly a “neo-liberalism” that can claim to unfold in the same way everywhere. It is no small coincidence that one account of “neo-liberalism” developed through an account of global networks and economy (or the “network society”). While this chapter is not the venue to wade too deeply into an argument about theories and
research of the global as neoliberal, the analytic that this chapter proposes more
modestly begins where liberalism’s work is never done—with the problems in
managing the little, everyday government of life through the on-going (and
increasingly individualized) technologies and networks of freedom. Accounting
for the “global”- or “post-global”-ness of a “neo-liberal” governmental rational­
ity begins by locating the changing/current techniques through which power and
government are individualized in the everyday. To the extent that television still
matters, it matters in part this way.

Acknowledgment

Some of the arguments in this chapter are ones that have benefited significant­
ly from my conversations and writing collaborations with Laurie Ouellette, who
has addressed similar points in her own writing. Some of the key points in sec­
tion two of this chapter are ones that Laurie and I have developed collabora­
tively. I am, as always, deeply indebted to her help and insight.

Notes

1. For an account of the political, economic, and cultural contradictions of PBS’s formation, see Laurie Ouellette, *Viewers Like You?: How Public TV Failed the People*, New York: Columbia UP, 2002.
2. For annual amounts spent for contracting by the US government, see link for Contracts at “USAspending.gov”: http://www.usaspending.gov/fds/index.php?reptype=a
3. For more on this series and its relation to ABC’s Better Community initiative, see Chapter 1, “Charity TV,” of Ouellette & Hay, 2008.
4. In 2008, the candidates for U.S. President (McCain, Clinton, and Obama) all taped videos

6. For examples of this, see Chapter 5, “TV’s Constitutions of Citizenship,” Better Living through Reality TV, op cit.
CHAPTER TEN

Privacy As Work

The Appropriation of Labor in Post-Global Network

The hybrid socio-technological evolution within our post-global network necessitates a method of capitalist appropriation of labor that has yet to be fully schematized theoretically. Seminal works by authors such as Mosco (1996), Castells (2000, 2001), Hardt and Negri (2000), Stratton (2000) and others have normalized network as our contemporary global model of both production and consumption. In terms of production, distributed models of development and manufacturing are so commonplace that terms such as "just in time" delivery and "outsourcing," popular just a decade ago, sound old fashioned. In terms of consumption, globalization of consumer culture and cultural imperialist projects (Cvetkovich and Kellner, 1997; Xie, 2008) have normalized "America" as the slick facade of global culture.

Studies of labor migration and the evolution of teleworkers, net-workers and the like have helped us understand the bio-machinic nature of sweatshops, such as in the case of Chinese gold farmers, and in other spaces where labor erupts in the global network. The "Cybertariat" (Huws, 2001) and "Binary Proletariat" (Bolt, 2000) are concepts already well-constructed and normalized in discourse. Traditional pre-global network formations of capitalism have thus been identified within the recently developed context of globalized production and consumption that have been enabled by global networks.

Important as such theorizations have been to the evolution of thinking through the production and consumption of labor, they have yet to fully account for the hybrid socio-technological nature of our post-global network. This chapter seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the appropriation of labor in the post-global network.